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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has recently become a favorite topic among court reform-
ers.1 They view arbitration, along with other forms of extra-judicial dispute
resolution techniques,8 as providing a speedy and inexpensive alternative to
the interminable delays and costs which have come to characterize court
proceedings.8
Arbitration is not a new idea for the marine industry4 which has relied
1. See, e.g., Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 78; Alter-
natives to Litigation: A Symposium, 48 ALB. L. REV. 569 (1984); Rayner, Arbitration: Private
Dispute Resolution as an Alternative to the Court, 22 UW. ONTARIO L. REV. 33 (1984);
Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business Transaction Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
69 (1983). The attraction to arbitration has been spurred in part by the belief that courts are
overworked, and in part by the belief that the cost of civil litigation is too high. It is thought
that arbitration reduces both delay and cost because arbitration proceedings do not follow
strict rules of evidence and arbitration awards are, for the most part, not subject to judicial
review. See Roth, When to Ignore the Rules of Evidence in Arbitration, LITIGATION, Winter
1983, at 20; Wiener, Is Arbitration an Answer?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 449 (1982).
2. Other types of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms which exist, in addition
to arbitration, include conciliation, mediation and the use of mini-trials. Conciliation and me-
diation are most often used in the area of family law. See, e.g., Zumeta, Mediation as an
Alternative to Litigation in Divorce, 62 MICH. B.J. 434 (1983); Bethel & Singer, Mediation: A
New Remedy for Cases of Domestic Violence, 7 VERMONT L. REV. 15 (1982); Parkinson,
Conciliation in Matrimonial Disputes, 14 BRACTON L.J. 30 (1981). For a critical analysis of
mediation, see Cooke, Mediation: A Boon or a Bust?, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3 (1983). For a
discussion of some of the ethical problems which can be encountered in an ADR system, see
Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L. Q. 107
(1982). An excellent general discussion of ADR mechanisms is contained in G. WILNER,
DOMKE ON ARBITRATION § 1:02 (Rev. ed. 1984).
3. It is generally thought that the American court system is unique when it comes to
delays and costs. Apparently this is not so, because arbitration has become popular throughout
the world. For a collection of relevant articles, see International Commercial Arbitration, 4
PACE L. REV. 519 (1984); Special Feature: Arbitration, 17 INT'L LAW. 661 (1983). For inter-
esting articles dealing with the arbitration systems of particular countries, see Ottolenghi, Ar-
bitration Institutions in Israel, 38 ARB. J. 53 (1983); Horrocks, Alternatives to the Courts in
Canada. 20 ALTA L. REV. 326 (1982); Lockett, Dispute Settlement in the People's Republic
of China: The Developing Role of Arbitration in Foreign Trade and Maritime Disputes, 16
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 239 (1982); and Seppala, French Domestic Arbitration Law,
16 INT'L LAW. 749 (1982).
4. It is difficult to define the marine industry, since any definition is at once both under-
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on arbitration to resolve disputes' since at least the 17th century.6 Those
familiar with maritime law and practice view the current widespread enthu-
siasm for arbitration with a touch of bemusement. The cause of this
bemusement is not cynicism. Rather, admiralty lawyers and their clients
7
inclusive and over-inclusive. The term is used here in a broad sense, although not in the
broadest possible sense. Thus, while all phases of commercial shipping, including shipbuilding,
marine insurance, charter parties, average adjusting, and salvage, are meant to be included,
the term is not used so as to encompass what is commonly called "pleasure boating," which
includes waterskiing and yachting. Nor are quasi-maritime vehicles such as seaplanes and
hovercrafts, which sometimes, but not always, engage in water-borne activity, included.
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial shipping activity is not merely a
semantic one. Rather, the dichotomy becomes extremely important when attempting to decide
whether a particular cause of action may be heard in federal court under the court's admiralty
jurisdiction, which is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). At one time a raging debate
was fought in the law reviews over the question of whether pleasure boat mishaps could be
heard in the federal courts under the admiralty jurisdiction. See, for example, Comment, The
Boating Boom: Admiralty Jurisdiction Inland, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169 (1969); and a
collection of articles published in 37 TEMPLE L.Q. 375 (1964). The seminal article, however,
was Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (1963). In
1972, the United States Supreme Court appeared to have decided the matter in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). In Executive Jet the Court held that
claims arising from an airplane accident which had occurred on navigable waters were not
cognizable in admiralty because the wrong complained of did not bear a significant relation-
ship to "traditional" maritime activity.
The Executive Jet doctrine was, however, rejected in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson,
457 U.S. 668 (1982). There the Court ruled that a pleasure boating accident should not have
been dismissed by the district court. Over a bitter dissent, Justice Marshall explained that the
need to subject all vessel owners to similar duties and liabilities was of paramount concern, and
that such uniformity in the admiralty law could only be achieved if all shipping claims were
heard by federal, as opposed to state, courts. The belief that admiralty law should be uniform
has caused considerable controversy since the time of the Revolution. The matter is discussed
in Jarvis, Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Company: A New Opportunity for Industry to
End State Regulation of Coastal Oil Pollution?, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 265, 280-84 (1984).
5. The types of maritime disputes which have been submitted to arbitration include ship
building contracts, ship repairing, ship sale and purchase, ship financing, and charter parties.
For a discussion of the many different types of marine arbitrations that are held, see
Berlingieri, International Maritime Arbitration, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 199 (1979).
6. Bischoff, Maritime Arbitration, in 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
PART 11 DOCUMENTS & COLLECTED PAPERS 14, 14-17 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1980). As Bischoff
points out, earlier records are scarce due to the destruction of most of the libraries of the
Mediterranean world.
7. It should be pointed out that there is no particular type of maritime client which either
does or does not suffer from arbitration delay. This is due to the fact that today's plaintiff, or
claimant, was yesterday's defendant, or respondent. To illustrate the point, consider the posi-
tion of a shipowner. On Monday he might be a claimant, seeking demurrage from a charterer
(demurrage is a penalty which a charterer must pay if it uses the owner's vessel for a period
longer than that contracted for). On Tuesday, however, the shipowner might be a respondent
in a claim by a cargo owner or receiver that the vessel damaged the cargo by improperly
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have learned, usually through bitter firsthand experience,8 that the arbitra-
tion process is often neither quick nor cheap.
A maritime arbitration becomes a slow and costly proceeding for many
reasons. The claimant's lawyer often faces intransigence from opposing
counsel.9 At times, lawyers fail to pursue diligently the arbitration, thereby
delaying their client's cause. At other times, lawyers prosecute a claim in
an overzealous manner, resulting in considerable extra expense to their cli-
ents.10 None of these phenomena are unique to admiralty arbitrations, since
they can, and do, occur in other types of proceedings as well.1"
One cause of delay, however, appears to be unique to arbitrations, par-
ticularily maritime arbitrations. Parties to maritime arbitration routinely
endure delay in receiving the decision of the arbitrators once all of the evi-
dence has been submitted and all of the post-hearing memoranda of law
have been filed. Non-admiralty arbitration disputants also face this di-
stowing it, thereby allowing it to become exposed to excessive heat or water. Thus, unlike some
other fields of law where plaintiffs and defendants are fairly easy to identify on a continuing
basis, no such generalizations are possible in admiralty.
8. For an interesting discussion written by an admiralty lawyer which details some of the
frustrations of the arbitration process, in contrast to the frustrations suffered when litigating
the same types of claims, see Textor, Petroleum Shortage Disputes: The Difference Between
the Legal and Arbitration Approach, 1983 LLOYD'S MAR. CoM. L.Q. 392.
9. It is usually the defendant's lawyer who seeks to slow down the pace of a matter, since
the defendant will usually not gain anything (except, perhaps, the peace of mind that comes
from the conclusion of any pending legal action) from a speedy end to the arbitration. How-
ever, if the defendant asserts counterclaims against the plaintiff, then the positions may be-
come reversed, especially if the counterclaims exceed the value of the plaintiffs claims. For a
discussion of what happens to maritime arbitration when the claimant allows the proceedings
to languish, see Lewis, When Arbitration Proceedings Become Stale, 1983 LLOYD'S MAR.
COM. L.Q. 289.
It is, of course, the ethical duty of a lawyer to improve the administration of justice. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1969). It is also the ethical duty of
a lawyer to further his client's cause. See id. Canon 7. These two demands place the lawyer in
an impossible situation: by delaying legal proceedings, he helps his client but fails in his obli-
gation as a court officer. By pushing forward, he fulfills his duty to the tribunal but not to his
client. The problem does not admit of an easy answer.
10. For an unusual case in which the admiralty lawyers settled a case in the early stages,
but then had to go to court when the client objected to paying the bill, see Walker & Corsa v.
Tunisian Office National Des Cereales, 1985 A.M.C. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). What distin-
guishes this case from the ordinary case in which a client does not pay is the motivation for
non-payment. Overjoyed by their success in negotiating such a favorable settlement for their
client, the lawyers decided to add a "bonus" to the agreed hourly fee. The client was willing to
pay the fee but not the bonus. In court the lawyers argued that it was a standard practice of
admiralty firms to add such bonuses if they achieved a particularly good result. After listening
to expert testimony, the court found that no such practice existed among admiralty firms.
II. A comprehensive review of the problem is contained in Special Issue on Dispute
Processing and Civil Litigation - Part 1, 15 L. & Soc'Y REv. 401 (1980).
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lemma to an extent,12 but the delay they experience is rarely as long as that
suffered by parties to admiralty arbitrations.
Post-hearing delay is prevalent in maritime arbitrations for two pri-
mary reasons. First, most maritime arbitrations do not proceed under rules
which limit the time the arbitrators have before rendering their opinion.
Second, most maritime arbitrations render a final award containing a
lengthy written explanation for the decision.13 These two factors to-
gether-the luxury of not being under a strict deadline, and the pressure of
producing a written award--cause maritime arbitrators to delay rendering
their awards for periods which are much longer than those of other com-
mercial arbitrators.
This article first provides an overview of maritime arbitration. Sec-
ondly, it details the problem of post-hearing arbitrator delay in the render-
ing of most maritime awards. Thirdly, it reviews the present mechanisms
currently addressing the problem and suggests that current methods are in-
adequate to reduce this delay effectively. Fourthly, it addresses the impact
of post-hearing delay. Finally, it will suggest steps that should be taken to
remedy the situation.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF MARITIME ARBITRATIONS
The maritime industry is an international industry. As such, almost
every maritime transaction will eventually cut across national boundaries
1 4
and bring together people from different backgrounds, customs and legal
systems. 5 While almost all types of maritime transactions are subject to
12. See, e.g., La Societe Nationale v. Shaheen Natural Resources Co. Inc., 585 F. Supp.
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Ash Apartments v. Martinez, 656 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1982); Brandon v.
Hines, 439 A.2d 496 (D.C. App. 1981); M. B. Guran Co., Inc. v. Amsdell, 459 N.E.2d 581
(Ohio App. 1983).
13. Some maritime arbitrations are held with rules which both impose time limits for the
rendering of awards and dispense with the need to issue a written award. For the most part,
however, these types of maritime arbitrations are limited to specific types of disputes, such as
salvage disputes. For an excellent primer on salvage law, see Sheen, Conventions on Salvage,
57 TUL. L. REv. 1387 (1983). See also infra note 92.
14. Certain forms of shipping, such as coastwise shipping, may not cut across national
boundaries and cultures. An example of coastwise shipping would be a voyage between the
Port of New York and the Port of Miami. Most countries have enacted what are called "cabo-
tage" laws, which restrict such shipping to domestic shipowners. The distinction between
coastwise shipping and foreign trade shipping is further reviewed in Huus v. New York &
Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392, 395 (1901) and Anderson v. Pacific S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187,
200 (1912). For a recent discussion of cabotage see Note, The Weakening Grip of United
States Cabotage Law, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391 (1980-81).
15. See Sommer, Maritime Transactions, in ARBITRATION-COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, IN-
SURANCE AND TORT CLAIMS 181 (A. Widiss ed. 1979). Sommer states at 181:
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resolution through arbitration,'6 the bulk of reported maritime arbitra-
tions17 involve issues relating to the negotiation, performance and conclu-
sion of charter parties. As a result, this article focuses on the issue of post-
hearing arbitrator delay in the rendering of charter party awards. 8
A. Charter Parties and Arbitration
A charter party is a contract by which an owner' 9 leases his ship to a
person or entity interested in having the use of an entire ship for a stated
period.20 Charter parties are negotiated through brokers.2 A concluded
It is not unlikely to have a Liberian flag vessel chartered through a London broker to
a Bermudian corporation, as charterer, who employed a Swiss broker, for a voyage of
that vessel from Rotterdam to Houston. The fixture telex may state, as an example, "de-
tails NYPE," resulting in an agreement to arbitrate at New York.
16. Although most maritime disputes which are submitted to arbitration are contractual
in nature, one does find reports of tortious maritime incidents being resolved through arbitra-
tion. See Berlingieri, supra note 5, at 235.
17. Some types of maritime arbitrations are never publicly reported. This is especially
true for salvage awards. The reason for this privacy is not entirely clear, although it can be
seen in other types of maritime transactions as well. Thus, almost all charter parties state that
their details are to remain strictly confidential. Just how strong the desire for privacy is in the
maritime industry is illustrated by a recent report which indicated that shipowners had been
able to collect $1.5 million between 1982 and 1984 from defaulting charterers simply by
threatening to disclose their non-payment to INTERTANKO, an industry trade group. See
Hubbard, Intertanko Combats Defaulters, Lloyd's List, Jan. 5, 1985, at 1.
18. Where possible, however, the article will discuss other forms of maritime arbitration
awards.
19. The use of the term "owner" here is not meant to be limited to the actual registered
owner of the vessel. If, for example, the registered owner charters the vessel to a party (Char-
terer A), and that party then re-charters (known in the trade as sub-chartering) the vessel to
another party (Charterer B), Charterer A stands in the shoes of both a charterer, vis-a-vis the
registered owner, and an owner, vis-a-vis Charterer B. Thus, Charterer A is called a disponent
owner. There can be an infinite number of sub-charters, and if such sub-charters exist, it is
said that there is a string charter, with duties and liabilities flowing both up and down the
chain. See further Bauer, Responsibilities of Owner and Charterer to Third Parties - Conse-
quences Under Time and Voyage Charters, 49 TUL. L. REV. 995 (1975).
20. A vessel can be chartered for one of three time periods. If the party wishes to have
the ship for only a specific number of voyages, usually one or two, a voyage charter will be
concluded. If the charterer wishes instead to have the use of the vessel for a period of time, a
time charter will be executed. Finally, if the charterer wishes to take complete control of the
vessel for a long period of time, usually five to twenty years, a demise charter will be signed.
Demise charters are fairly rare; their principal use is as a financing mechanism. An excellent
discussion of the different kinds of charters available is contained in SCRUTrON ON CHARTER
PARTIES AND BILLS OF LADING, (A. Mocatta, M. Mustill & S. Boyd 19th ed. 1984).
21. For a recent case which discussed the authority of brokers to negotiate charter par-




charter party is known as a fixture.22
Specialized charter parties have been developed for many types of
cargo.23 Thus, for example, there are charter parties for the carrying of
ore, 24 grain, 25 oil"6 and scrap metal.27 Although these charter parties are
tailored to reflect the special problems which can be encountered while car-
rying a particular cargo,28 there are similarities among them as well. In
particular, each form of charter party in use today calls for the resolution
of any disputes arising under the charter party29 through arbitration.
22. For a further discussion of chartering practice, see P. GRAM, CHARTERING Docu-
MENTS (1981).
23. Innumerable charter parties have been drafted. A comprehensive collection of charter
parties is contained in 2B and 2C E. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY (M. Cohen & M.
Norris 7th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1984). Over one hundred charter forms are reproduced there. In
the average admiralty lawyer's practice, however, one will only use a handful of forms.
24. Charter parties are referred to in the trade by what are often colorful acronyms. In
addition, most commodities have given rise to more than one type of charter. Thus, 2B E.
BENEDICT, supra note 23, at § 12-1 to § 12-101, lists fifteen separate charters for the carrying
of ore. These charters include CEMENCO (for the carrying of cement), GENORECON (for
the carrying of general ores), and BULK FORM (for the carrying of bulk ores). In addition,
charter party names often reflect their national origin. Thus, there is SCANORECON (an ore
charter party developed in Scandanavia), NIPPONORE (a Japanese ore charter party) and
SOVORECON (a Soviet ore charter party). While some charter parties have gained world-
wide acceptance, others have remained local. Perhaps the best known form of charter is the
NYPE, or New York Produce Exchange, charter. For an entertaining, as well as illuminating,
discussion of the history of the NYPE, see Healy, Commentary on 1981 Revision of the New
York Produce Exchange Form Time Charter, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 521 (1982).
25. 2B E. BENEDICT, supra note 23, at § 8-1 to § 8-79, lists eight different kinds of grain
charter parties. Unlike the charter parties covering other types of commodities, most grain
charter parties now in use are of comparatively recent origin. Of the eight listed in BENEDICT.
two were drafted in the 1960s and five were drafted in the 1970s.
26. Oil charter parties are a distinct breed of charter parties, having been drafted or
amended in the wake of the 1973 Arab Oil embargo. They address the special environmental
threat posed by oil, and also deal with the risks posed by the supertankers which are used to
carry the oil. For two excellent descriptions of the problems which are faced in the marine
transportation of oil, see N. MOSTERT, SUPERSHIP (1974) and R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER,
POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979).
27. The scrap metal charter party is known as GENJAPSCRAP. Despite its most en-
chanting name, this very specialized charter party is rarely seen in practice. An even more
specialized form is INCHARPASS, which- is a passenger charter party.
28. Specific types of cargo can pose unique problems. See supra note 26. Consider, for
example, the carrying of coal. Coal is a very dangerous cargo, because it has the capacity to
overheat and ignite if not correctly stowed. Despite centuries of dealing with this problem,
"hot coal" incidents, as they are known, continue to plague vessels. For two recent examples of
such incidents, see Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. M/V Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1984) and
Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc., 1984 A.M.C. 2858 (E.D.
Va. 1984).
29. The issue of whether a given dispute arises under a charter party, thus activating the
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The basic pattern of arbitration envisioned by these clauses may be
summarized as follows. When one of the parties believes itself aggrieved, it
can institute arbitration proceedings by choosing an arbitrator and serving a
demand for arbitration on the other side. Once served, the other side is
required to name its arbitrator. Thereafter, the two arbitrators named by
the parties select a third arbitrator, who is designated as the Chairman of
the arbitration panel.30 Once the panel is complete, the parties attend hear-
ings,3 ' submit their evidence, and file memoranda of law if they so desire.
Later, the arbitrators render their award. Although most parties voluntarily
abide by the award of the arbitrators, an award can be turned into a judg-
ment of the court.32 This is done by bringing a confirmation proceeding.
Judges routinely grant requests to confirm arbitration awards,33 and once
an award is confirmed, it can be enforced in most other countries.3 4
charter party's arbitration clause, provides fertile ground for disagreement. In the United
States, the question whether a particular dispute is covered by the charter party is submitted
to the federal courts. They, in turn, have interpreted arbitration clauses very broadly. See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1950) (construing a
non-maritime arbitration agreement) and Caribbean S.S. Co. S.A. v. Sonmez Denizcilik v.
Ticaret A.S., 598 F.2d 1264 (2d Cir. 1979) (construing a maritime arbitration agreement). A
notable exception to this policy occurs when arbitration is demanded under a bill of lading
which is said to incorporate the terms of the charter party. Compare Son Shipping Co. v.
DeFosse & Tanghe, 199 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1952) and Cia Platamon de Navegacion S.A. v.
Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos, 478 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
30. The position of Chairman is a crucial one. The Chairman is entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of making, after consultation with the other members of the panel, all of the proce-
dural decisions which affect the arbitration. In addition, the Chairman has the responsibility
for seeing to the administrative tasks of the panel, such as the setting of hearing dates and the
transcribing of the award. For a further discussion of the role of the Chairman, see Sommer,
supra note 15, at 201-02. In English practice the Chairman is usually designated an umpire,
and votes only to break ties between the other members of the panel. McIntosh, The Practice
of Maritime Arbitrations in London: Recent Developments in the Law, 1983 LLOYD'S MAR.
COM. L.Q. 235, 241.
3 1. Not all arbitrations include the holding of hearings. If the only evidence to be submit-
ted consists of documents, in contrast to the presentation of witnesses, the parties may agree to
proceed "on submission." The elimination of hearings shortens the arbitration process and
reduces the ultimate cost. Healy, An Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 J. MAR.
L. & CoM. 223, 232-33 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Healy, Federal Arbitration].
32. Sommer, supra note 15, at 208-12 contains a useful summary of the judicial means
available to enforce an arbitration award.
33. Some admiralty lawyers have argued that judges have become so used to confirming
arbitration awards that it is now almost impossible to defeat such confirmations. See Kimball,
Vacating Maritime Arbitration Awards: Is it Really Possible?, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 71
(1981); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (emphasizing that under the Federal Arbitration
Act there are only four grounds available to vacate); see also infra note 170.
34. Extraterritorial enforcement of a maritime arbitration award is achieved through the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
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Of course, the above description is a highly streamlined version of the
maritime arbitration process. In practice, there are many variations, de-
pending upon the type of charter party involved. Some arbitration clauses,
for example, require the arbitrators to be "commercial men,"35 while others
place no restriction on who may serve as an arbitrator.36 Other clauses may
provide that a party which does not receive a response to its arbitration
demand within a specified period of time, usually twenty days, may name
an arbitrator for the other side with the same effect as if the party had
named the arbitrator itself.37 In contrast, clauses which do not so provide
have been held not to authorize such unilateral action.38 Arbitration clauses
may stipulate that parties may recover the costs of the arbitration if they
are successful, including attorneys' fees,39 while more standard clauses do
not so provide. 0 Other variations also exist.41
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New
York June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force
June 7, 1959). A thorough discussion of the New York Convention is presented in Thomas,
International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards - A Commentary on the Arbitration Act 1975, 1981 LLOYD'S MAR.COM. L.Q. 17.
35. The term "commercial men" has become something of a term of art. As is pointed
out in Healy, Federal Arbitration, supra note 31, at 232, "most of the 'commercial men' who
serve as arbitrators are executives with steamship operating companies and agencies, grain, oil
and other companies which frequently charter ships, and chartering brokerage firms." At
times, however, the courts have been called upon to decide whether a particular arbitrator is a
commercial man. In Pando Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Filmo S.A.S. [1975] 1 Lloyd's L.R.
560, the charter party required the arbitrators to be commercial men. One party appointed as
its arbitrator a full-time arbitrator who had once practiced law. The court held that despite his
earlier vocation as a lawyer, the arbitrator should be considered to have become a commercial
man when he stopped practicing law and took up his position as a full-time arbitrator. For a
case where the court found that an arbitrator was not a commercial man and invalidated the
arbitration, see Rahcassi Shipping Co. S.A. v. Blue Star Line, Ltd., [19671 2 Lloyd's L.R.
261.
36. As Healy, Federal Arbitration, supra note 31, at 232, points out, "Most of the tanker
forms, however, allow the appointment of either commercial men or lawyers, and at least one
form provides that the arbitrators appointed by the parties are to be commercial men, while
the third arbitrator is to be an admiralty lawyer." There are times, however, when the three
arbitrators who have been chosen are all lawyers. For a recent example of such an arbitration,
see Universe Tankships, Inc. v. Burmah Oil Tankers Ltd., S.M.A. No. 2016 (Arb. at N.Y.,
June 15, 1984). That arbitration was conducted pursuant to a Texaco time charter party
which required all three arbitrators to be admiralty lawyers.
37. For an example of this type of charter party, see clause 24 of the EXXONVOY 1969
charter party. The charter party is reproduced in 2C E. BENEDICT, supra note 23, at § 17-54
to § 17-65.
38. In re Utility Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
39. See, e.g., clause 29 of the STB VOY form of charter party. The charter party is
reproduced in 2C E. BENEDICT. supra note 23, at § 17-165 to § 17-176.
40. The question of whether arbitrators can grant attorneys' fees in the absence of a
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Besides providing for arbitrations, charter parties also provide a venue
for such proceedings. Invariably, the charter party will state that the arbi-
tration is to be held in either London or New York. 2
clause which specifically grants such power to the arbitrators has now been judicially decided.
In Transvenezuelan Shipping Co. S.A. v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 1982 A.M.C. 1458
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court held that arbitrators did not have the authority to grant attorneys'
fees unless they were explicitly empowered to do so. See also Sammi Line Co., Ltd. v. Altamar
Navegacion S.A., No. 84-9196 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1985). Parties, however, may grant such
authority to the arbitrators during the course of an arbitration proceeding, and such authority
will be valid even if the arbitration clause did not initially provide for the awarding of attor-
neys' fees. Kimball, Arbitration: Arbitrators Do Not Have Power to Award Attorneys' Fees
Unless the Arbitration Agreement So Provides, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 370 (1982).
41. Perhaps the most important variation is the situation in which arbitration is com-
menced where there is a string charter. As discussed, supra note 19, a string charter involves
numerous parties, each of which may attempt to "pass through" its liability to the party above
or below it in the string. Since each string charter is concluded by a separate charter party,
and since each charter party allows the contracting party to name one arbitrator, the possibil-
ity exists for both multiple arbitrations and consolidated arbitrations consisting of a panel
which has more than three arbitrators.
Multiple arbitrations are rare, however, as consolidation is favored by both courts and
parties. Although in theory consolidated panels could consist of as many arbitrators as there
are string charters, in practice some parties will discover that their interests are united with
those of another party. Such parties will then agree to waive their individual rights to name an
arbitrator and proceed to select one arbitrator among themselves. Thus, the largest panel
which normally hears cases is made up of five arbitrators. It is easy to appreciate how much
more unwieldly a five man panel is than a three man panel, since the schedules of two addi-
tional arbitrators must be accommodated. For a further consideration of consolidated arbitra-
tions, see Vigo Steamship Corp. v. Marship Corp. of Monrovia, 26 N.Y.2d 157 (1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970). Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upset what had
been the longstanding practice with regard to the judicial corsolidation of arbitrations. See
Weyerhaeuser Co. v.Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
53 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. 1984). In contrast to consolidated arbitrations, the parties will some-
times agree to let a single arbitrator decide the case. This procedure is frequently used in
London. For a discussion of the use of single arbitrators in England, see McIntosh, supra note
30, at 236. In New York few arbitrations are heard by single arbitrators. See infra note 79.
42. Despite the fact that most charter parties in use today call for arbitration in either
London or New York, the reader should not assume that arbitration in the two cities is identi-
cal, subject only to variations in local customs. Instead, there are significant differences be-
tween the two cities, and great care must be used to insure that a charter party calling for
arbitration in one city is not altered to provide for arbitration in the other, unless equal atten-
tion is given to a number of other factors. For an excellent study of the problems which can
result from haphazard substitution, see Cohen, A Venue Problem with the Arbitration Clauses
Found in Printed Form Charters, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 541 (1976). Some of the differences
pointed out in this study were ameliorated with the passage of the 1979 amendments to the
English Arbitration Act of 1950. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, amended by, ch. 3,
1975 and ch. 42, 1979. For a discussion of the changes, and how they affect English arbitra-
tion practice, see Smedresman, The Arbitration Act, 1979, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 319 (1980).
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B. The Historical Role of the Cities of London and New York with
Regard to Maritime Arbitrations
1. The City of London
Arbitration in London has long been an accepted part of international
trade. '3 London arbitration has generally fallen into three distinct classes:
commodities, maritime and insurance."" Of course, since marine ventures
often involve the carriage of insured commodities, there has been a great
deal of overlap among these three classes.45
London's prominence as a center of maritime arbitration requires some
historical explanation. Prior to the Norman invasion of 1066, England was
a commercially backwards country."' Following their conquest, the
Normans achieved a degree of central organization that had been unknown
in Europe since the days of the Roman empire. Despite this success, En-
glish commercial law did not begin to develop until after the 13th century."'
English maritime trade did not emerge until the 16th century,48 although
seafaring had been known since at least 3000 B.C.49 Once England began
its maritime trade, however, it soon became a world leader. By the begin-
ning of the 20th century, more than 50% of the world's tonnage50 travelled
43. Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice. 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 656 (1952).
44. Smedresman, supra note 42, at 319.
45. A further cause of overlap is the fact that the vessel carrying the goods will have been
insured, usually through an English marine underwriting firm such as Lloyds of London or
through one of the mutual societies of shipowners, known as Protection and Indemnity As-
sociations (P. & I. Clubs). Although Clubs exist outside of England (there are, for example,
American and Japanese Clubs), the most important Clubs are based in England. For a discus-
sion of the Clubs, see R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 26, at 374-81.
46. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 15.
47. Id.
48. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 15. As G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
(2d ed. 1975), explain at § 1-2, sea commerce began to gain importance in modern history
during the 9th and 10th centuries. By the early 14th century, Venice, the leading sea power of
the day, had over 3,000 ships afloat.
49. A short but useful discussion of the origin of shipping is contained in G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, supra note 48, at § 1-2.
50. Non-mariners sometimes treat the terms tonnage and registered vessels alike, when in
fact they represent completely different concepts. The former relates to the size of the vessels
in a nation's fleet, while the latter states the number of vessels in the fleet. This difference
between the terms has sparked international lawsuits. In January 1959, the General Assembly
of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO, now known as IMO),
which is a United Nations agency concerned with shipping matters, began to elect members to
its Maritime Safety Committee. IMCO decided to exclude Panama and Liberia from the
Committee. The Constitution of IMCO required that eight of the fourteen nations selected to
serve on the Committee be the "largest shipowning nations." This provoked a controversy over
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under the British flag)6
More important than the number of ships flying the British flag, how-
ever, was the number of fixtures which were being concluded in London.
Until the advent of modern communications, especially the telex, 2 made
them unnecessary, the principal means which existed for the making of a
fixture was the exchange. An exchange was a place where brokers and
others could meet to find out who had ships to hire out and who was inter-
ested in hiring vessels.'3 Exchanges existed for specific types of commodi-
what was intended by the term "shipowning nation." Although Panama and Liberia had few
shipowners, they had, respectively, the third and eighth largest number of registered vessel
tons. The matter was finally settled by the International Court of Justice ruling in favor of
Panama and Liberia, who were then seated on the Committee. See Advisory Opinion on the
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consult-
ative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. 150. On how Panama and Liberia could have so few shipown-
ers and so many registered tons, see infra note 51.
51. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 17. It is difficult today to talk about a country's sea power
on the basis of the number of ships which are "flying its flag" (i.e., registered under its laws)
at a given moment. This is due to the fact that many shipowners have, since the 1930s, found
it advantageous to register their ships in States other than their own. A ship which is so regis-
tered is said to be flying a "Flag of Convenience" (FOC), since the principal reason to register
under a FOC is to take advantage of the lax safety rules and low taxes which are afforded by
FOC states. The leading FOC states have been Panama, Liberia and Honduras, collectively
known as PanLibHon. For an excellent book on PanLibHon and FOCs in general, see R.
CARLISLE. SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE (1981). In 1980 the joint Anglo-French Condominium of
the New Hebrides became the independent Republic of Vanuatu. In 1981, it became the new-
est FOC State, determined to offer shipowners the most favorable terms available. For an
excellent article on Venuatu's position as an FOC State, see Hubbard, Registration of a Ves-
sel under Vanuatu Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 235 (1982).
The conversion of a vessel's flag from that of its home State to that of an FOC State often
causes a hostile reaction from marine workers, who fear a loss of jobs. This problem has be-
come a significant one in England, where several lawsuits have arisen over the issue. For a
discussion of some of these lawsuits, see Ewing, Union Action Against Flags of Convenience -
The Legal Position in Great Britain, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 503 (1980). The American posi-
tion on such union activity was settled by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). In that case the Court held that the
National Labor Relations Act did not apply to FOC vessels. This decision was a fatal blow to
American unions, who had been attempting to organize the crews of FOC ships. The Court's
holding that the Act did not apply to such union activity meant that shipowners were free to
seek injunctions against such activity. As a result, only sporadic, and inconsequential, union
activity has been taken against FOC vessels calling at American ports.
52. For an interesting discussion on the use of the telex in the negotiating of international
contracts, see Lewis, The Formation and Repudiation of Contracts by International Telex,
1980 LLOYD'S MAR. CoM. L.Q. 433.
53. Despite the advent of technology, the basic operation of ship chartering remains the
same. One party has a ship which it wishes to hire out, while another party is in need of a ship.
Thus, Bischoff, supra note 6, at 28 n. 13, speaks of interested parties concluding charters
during "meetings" held by teleprinters.
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ties"' as well as for general cargoes.55 The most important "general cargo
exchange" became the Baltic Exchange in London, which began as the Bal-
tic Coffee House in the 17th century.5" Although exchanges existed in cities
other than London, none rivaled London in terms of importance or
influence. 5
7
Apart from the number of ships flying the Union Jack and the exis-
tence of the exchanges, three other factors propelled London's rise to prom-
inence as an international center for the resolution of maritime disputes.
First, the English Parliament recognized at an early date the importance of
arbitration by passing an Arbitration Act in 1698.11 This Act applied to all
commercial matters, including maritime ventures.59 Second, there was an
absence of revolution and sudden upheaval in England, in contrast to the
more tumultuous conditions which existed in other countries, such as
France.10 Finally, because so many ships were English and so many fixtures
were being concluded in London on English contract forms, it was logical
that when arbitration was called for London became the situs.6"
54. Id. at n. 14.
55. Id. As explained by Bischoff and others, chartering involving specific types of cargo,
such as timber, would usually be left to the provincial exchanges, while general cargoes would
be chartered in the exchanges of major cities such as London. Presumably due to their greater
geographical proximity to the source of the specific cargo, the provincial exchanges were in a
better position than the city exchanges to keep in touch with movements in their particular
markets.
56. Id. The Baltic Exchange also developed several types of charter parties which were
widely used by its members and others. In keeping with the type of cargoes fixed at the Ex-
change, these charter parties were for use with general cargoes. An example of a charter party
produced by the Baltic Exchange which is still in circulation today is the BALTIME 1939
form, a copy of which is reproduced in 2B E. BENEDICT, supra note 23, at § 7-2 to § 7-7. For a
complete account of the Baltic Exchange from its founding through 1976, see H. BARTY-KING,
THE BALTIC EXCHANGE - THE HISTORY OF A UNIQUE MARKET (1977).
57. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 17.
58. For a discussion of the Arbitration Act of 1698, (Arbitration Act, 1698, 9 Will. 3),
together with the Acts which have succeeded it, see RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 2-
3 (A. Walton 19th ed. 1979).
59. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 17.
60. Id. The relative peace enjoyed by Britain, in contrast to the events taking place on the
Continent, provided the background for Charles Dickens' immortal A TALE OF Two CITIES.
61. The continual choice of London as the situs for maritime dispute settlement has
achieved both judicial notice and approval. In Pando Compania Naviera S.A. v. Filmo S.A.S.,
[1957] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 560, Justice Donaldson remarked that "a domestic arbitration service
has grown up in London which serves the shipping and commodity trades on a world-wide
basis." In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a forum selection clause in a towage contract which called for the resolu-
tion of all disputes in London. Although the clause called for disputes to be resolved by the
English Commercial Court rather than in arbitration, there can be no doubt that the Supreme
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Hence, by 1900 London had become virtually synonomous with mari-
time arbitrations. Even when an arbitration was not held in London, many
foreign arbitrators would rely on English law and practice to settle the dis-
pute submitted to them.02
Following World War I, many maritime arbitrations began to be held
in New York, and London began to lose its monopoly on such proceedings.
Nonetheless, London continues today to be the site of many maritime arbi-
trations, and some marine issues, such as salvage, continue to be heard al-
most exclusively in London.63 In recognition of this fact, the London Mari-
time Arbitrators' Association (LMAA) was formed in the early 1960s64
Court was making a policy choice heavily influenced by England's reputation as a center for
admiralty dispute resolution. In particular, it should be noted that the contract was between
two corporations, one German, the other American, and called for the towage of an American
oil rig from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea. The rig was damaged during a storm in the Gulf of
Mexico, after which she was towed to Tampa, Florida. Legal proceedings were begun in Flor-
ida. The Fifth Circuit found these factors to be decisive and invalidated the selection of
London. As noted, the Supreme Court upheld the choice of London, by a vote 8-1. The lone
dissenter was Justice Douglas. For a discussion of the case, see Black, The Bremen, COGSA,
and the Problem of Conflicting Interpretation, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1973).
62. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 17. The influence which English maritime decisions has
enjoyed in foreign cities has continued to be very great even in recent times. In America,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined that, ".... Of course, it is desirable, if there is no
injustice, that the maritime law of this country and of England should agree." The Eliza
Lines, 199 U.S. 119, 128 (1905). It thus came as something of a shock when a panel of New
York arbitrators flatly stated that they were not bound by English charter party law. Inter-
ocean Shipping Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 1974 A.M.C. 2161 (Arb. at N.Y., Sept. 6,
1974).
63. Salvage arbitration is centered almost exclusively in London because London arbitra-
tion is called for in the Lloyd's Salvage Agreement. The Lloyd's Salvage Agreement was first
drawn up in 1892 by the insurance underwriters at Lloyd's, and since 1908 has been the only
form recognized by that body. It is undisputed that the Lloyd's form is the most popular form
of salvage contract today. See, e.g., the remarks of the House of Lords in The Valverda, 1938
A.C. 173, 197, 202. It was recently pointed out that 250 salvage arbitrations pursuant to the
Lloyd's form are held each year, or about one every working day. See O'May, Lloyd's Form
and the Montreal Convention, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1412, 1412 n.l (1983). One problem, at least
for commentators, is that the awards rendered under the Lloyd's form are confidential, and
thus not available to the public. This limitation has been somewhat eased, however, by the
publication of G. BRICE, MARITIME LAW OF SALVAGE (1983). Although he does not reveal any
of the awards, Mr. Brice is in an excellent position to comment on salvage awards because he
is one of the Lloyd's Salvage Adjusters. While other forms of salvage contract exist, their use
is limited. For a survey of these other forms, see Miller, Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage
Agreement - "LOF 1980": A Commentary, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 243, 244 (1981). For two
recent, and therefore rare, American salvage cases, see B. V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United
States, 1976 A.M.C. 2514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) and In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d
789 (7th Cir. 1981). As is obvious, both of these disputes were litigated rather than arbitrated.
64. As Bischoff, supra note 6, at 17, explains, the Baltic Maritime and Shipping Ex-
change originally kept a list of arbitrators and organized a panel as the need arose. This proce-
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with a membership of approximately fifty-five. 65 Most maritime disputes
are submitted to LMAA arbitrators, although London maritime arbitra-
tions are sometimes heard by non-LMAA arbitrators."" Interestingly, how-
ever, only a few LMAA arbitrators are active,67 resulting in most maritime
arbitrations being heard by the same handful of arbitrators.
2. New York City
New York City did not become an important international center for
the hearing of maritime disputes until this century. This was probably due
to two factors. First, American flag tonnage prior to 1900 was negligible."'
Second, the United States tended to follow a policy of isolation with respect
to the rest of the world, with the notable exception of South America,6"
until the advent of World War I. Following World War I, the United
States emerged from the war with a surplus of tonnage,7 0 and as a new
world leader.71
These two factors alone would not have been enough for New York to
wrest from London a substantial number of maritime arbitrations. A third
dure apparently became inadequate and led to the creation of the LMAA. The LMAA's cur-
rent address is: The Honorable Secretary LMAA, 8th Floor, Brettenham House, Lancaster
Place, London, WC2E 7EN, United Kingdom.
65. Id. For a useful account of maritime arbitrations in London today, see McIntosh,
supra note 30.
66. Bischoff, supra note 6, at 17.
.67. Id.
68. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 48, at § 11-4, have written of this period that:
By 1900, the British steams were supreme in most important trades, and the Ameri-
can merchant marine was utterly insignificant. Postal subsidies and other half-hearted aid
could do no more than keep it from disappearing entirely.
69. Early in its history the United States became deeply concerned with South America.
This concern led to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, by which American served notice that it
would not tolerate interference by outside powers in the affairs of that region. Except for this
pronouncement, the United States was not active in world affairs.
70. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 48, at § 11-5. In order to address the problems
caused by this surplus of tonnage, the United States Congress enacted the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 988 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-889 (1982)) and increased the powers
of the United States Shipping Board. Both of these matters are discussed at length in Chapter
X1, 958-996, of G. GILMORE & C. BLACK. See generally H. BESS & M. FERRIS, U.S. MARITIME
POLICY: HISTORY AND PROSPECTS (1981). (Chapters 2 and 3 trace maritime history from the
Colonial period to 1936. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the period from the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 through 1970.)
71. Isolation did, however, return for a time in the late 1930s, when some Americans,
notably Charles Lindbergh, urged Americans to avoid entering the Second World War in a
movement known as the "America First" campaign. See W. MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND
THE DREAM 219-24 (1973).
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factor which contributed to the development of New York City as an inter-
national maritime arbitration center was the passage of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act by the United States Congress on February 12, 1925.2
Prior to the passage of the Act, the American federal judiciary had
been extremely hostile to arbitration, because it felt that contracts to arbi-
trate were against public policy.7s Maritime arbitration became more prev-
alent once Congress gave its imprimatur on arbitration,7 4 specifically men-
tioning maritime disputes in the Act.75 Today, the volume of maritime
litigation, especially charter party litigation, in contrast to arbitration, is
small.7 1 A notable exception, however, involves suits by seamen and other
marine workers for injury or death. 77
In 1963 the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. (SMA) was founded
72. Federal Arbitration Act, Feb. 12, 1925, c. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§
1-14 (1982)). The Act has been written about extensively. The leading discussion is found in
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
73. See the discussion contained in G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 201-04 (1939).
74. The constitutionality of the Federal Arbitration Act was upheld in Marine Transit
Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
75. Maritime transactions are referred to in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act,
where they are defined to include charter parties, bills of lading, wharfage agreements, the
furnishing of supplies to vessels, collisions and all other matters which, if submitted to a fed-
eral court, would come within the court's admiralty jurisdiction. The recent problems which
have been experienced in deciding whether a given matter is within the court's admiralty juris-
diction are discussed supra note 4. By contrast, admiralty jurisdiction in England is very lim-
ited, owing to the historical jealousies which existed between the common law courts and the
admiralty court. The matter is fully discussed in F. WISWALL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMI-
RALTY JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE 1800 (1970). For a discussion of the recent
changes which were made in England's admiralty jurisdiction, see Jackson, Admiralty Juris-
diction - The Supreme Court Act 1981, 1982 LLOYD'S MAR. COM. L.Q. 236 (discussing the
Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54).
76. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 48, have written at § 4-1, that: "[Airbitration
• .. has largely taken the place of litigation. It is only infrequently, today, that a court is
called on to construe a charter." Charter party issues, however, do occasionally reach the Su-
preme Court. The most recent decision of the Court involving a true charter question is Mas-
sachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas & Fuel Assoc. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
77. A number of acts passed by Congress in the 1920s specifically provided that suits by
seamen and other marine workers could be heard in federal court by a jury, in contrast to the
usual rule in admiralty which denies the right to a jury trial. Thus, there has been no rush by
seamen to embrace arbitration, who apparently believe (probably correctly) that they stand to
collect larger damages from juries than maritime arbitration panels. Recall, supra note 35,
that many maritime arbitrators today are executives of shipowning companies. A useful dis-
cussion of the various Congressional Acts, known respectively as the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1982), the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982), and the Long-
shoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982), is contained
in G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 48, at Chapter VI.
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in New York City, modelled along the lines of the LMAA.7 8 The Society
today has approximately 120 members, although as with the LMAA, only a
handful of members are active.
7 9
III. THE NATURE OF MARITIME ARBITRATIONS
AND THE PHENOMENA OF DELAY
Arbitration is generally perceived as flexible, informal, speedy and in-
expensive. Certainly New York maritime arbitrations are both flexible and
78. The Society maintains an office at 26 Broadway in New York City. A published
history of the Society does not appear to be available, although a discussion of the Society's
founding and purposes can be found in Zubrod, Maritime Arbitration in New York, ARB. J.,
Dec. 1984, at 16: see also Bauer, Manifest Disregard of the Law, 1979 LLOYD'S MAR. COM. L.
Q. 142, 146-47.
79. In 1984, the SMA published 111 awards. Of these 111, 105 were heard by three man
panels, 4 were decided by 2 man panels, and 2 were decided by sole arbitrators. Thus, 325
arbitrator slots were generated by these Ill arbitrations. According to the 1984-85 Roster of
the SMA, there were 124 SMA arbitrators in 1984. If each SMA arbitrator heard exactly as
many arbitrations as every other SMA arbitrator, each SMA arbitrator would have heard 2.62
arbitrations in 1984. In reality, however, no such division of labor occurred. Instead, as pointed
out infra note 105, the hearing of arbitrations was concentrated among a select group of SMA
arbitrators, as shown in the following table:
Number of Awards














* The number of arbitral appointments accepted in any given year is, however, much greater
than the number of awards published. In addition, some of the 111 awards represent Partial
Final Awards which await final disposition.
It should also be pointed out that these figures tend to understate the level of concentra-
tion among SMA members since some of the published awards were issued by non-SMA
members. Thus, the number of slots available to SMA arbitrators in 1984 was somewhat less
than the 325 discussed above.
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informal.80 Few would describe current maritime arbitration, however, as
being either speedy or inexpensive.8' There are several reasons for this.82
For present purposes, however, the only cause of delay and cost which this
article will discuss is the arbitrator delay which occurs once the arbitrators
have received all of the evidence the parties wish to submit and the hearings
are declared closed.8 3 Arbitrator delay is easier to identify and analyze than
80. Healy, Federal Arbitration, supra note 31, notes at 232 that, "Ordinarily, New York
maritime arbitrations are conducted very informally." Maritime arbitrations appear to be
somewhat more formal in London. McIntosh, supra note 30, at 241, describes an English
arbitration as being only superficially informal. He does note, however, that barristers do not
wear robes before the arbitrators, in contrast to their court appearances.
81. A recent study of New York maritime arbitrations found that there was almost uni-
versal agreement that arbitrations tended to suffer from delay. See Iwasaki, A Survey of Mar-
itime Arbitration in New York, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 69 (1984). The survey, however, is
flawed because of its limited statistical base. Iwasaki solicited responses from 65 lawyers and 3
professors, but only received 25 responses.
The problem of delay has also plagued London arbitrations. For a discussion of delay
prior to the commencement of arbitral proceedings, see Thomas, Power of Court to Extend
Time for Commencing Arbitration Proceedings, 1981 LLOYD'S MAR. COM. L. Q. 529. For a
discussion of delay once the arbitration has begun, see Lewis, supra note 9, and cases cited
therein.
82. Indeed, many arbitrations are begun solely as a negotiating ploy, in an attempt to
force the other side to enter into serious settlement negotiations. Healy, Federal Arbitration,
supra note 31, at 232. Thus, it is not uncommon to find arbitrations which have been "held in
abeyance" for years. Lewis, supra note 9. The problem of stale claims is, of course, not unique
to arbitrations, for it also occurs in litigation. The problem will often be dealt with sooner in
litigation than in arbitration, however, because arbitrators are under no pressure to "clear up"
their dockets by reducing backlog. In contrast, since judges are public officials, they are under
tremendous pressure to keep their cases moving along so that their dockets are up-to-date. The
matter is taken up in a series of articles entitled Recent Civil Court Research and Change, 8
JUST. SYS. J. 258 (1983). In addition to pursuing arbitration without sincere motives, lawyers
and arbitrators add to the problems of delay and cost during the proceeding by requesting and
granting extensions for the filing of briefs- and early adjournments for hearings.
83. The problem of post-hearing delay in the rendering of maritime arbitration awards
has not, it seems, previously been dealt with in the literature on maritime arbitrations. This is
surprising, since there is apparent agreement that delays in obtaining awards is significant. In
the 1984 study of New York maritime arbitration, 72% (18 out of 25) of the admiralty law-
yers who responded to the study indicated that they had experienced delay in "scheduling
hearings and obtaining awards." Iwasaki, supra note 81, at 71-72. Of course, the value of this
statistic is limited in that the survey question grouped the two problems into one question,
when, in fact, the problems are distinct. The former problem speaks to delays occurring during
the evidence-gathering stage of the arbitration (which includes the presentation of witnesses
and writing of legal memoranda), while the latter problem begins to arise only after the evi-
dence-gathering stage has been completed. This is not to suggest that post-hearing arbitrator
delay is greater than arbitrator delay during the proceeding; indeed, perhaps this is why the
Iwasaki study grouped the two concepts together.
The analogous problem of post-hearing delay in labor arbitration, however, has been writ-
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other types of delay because the responsibility of rendering the award is
solely the arbitrator's.
A. The Causes of Arbitrator Delay Following the Reception of
Evidence
1. Concentration of Arbitral Duties
One reason for delay in the rendering of awards is the changing nature
of the maritime arbitral profession. In earlier times, the profession enjoyed
wide participation from the entire group of individuals who had sufficient
expertise to serve as an arbitrator; in fact, serving as an arbitrator was seen
as an obligation incumbent upon each person in the industry.84 Today, how-
ever, the total number of individuals who comprise the profession has de-
creased. Furthermore, of those who accept appointments, many are rela-
tively inactive, accepting only one or two appointments a year. The total
number of active arbitrators, accepting more than two appointments a year,
constitutes a relatively small percentage of the profession and a very small
percentage of the total number of individuals who qualify to serve as mari-
time arbitrators. In addition, only a handful of the available arbitrators are
ever appointed by parties."6 The interaction of the foregoing factors has
resulted in a concentration of arbitral duties in the hands of relatively few
people.
An additional aspect of this concentration of arbitral duties in the pro-
fession is the trend of a growing number of individuals to make arbitration
their full-time profession. This trend has increased in recent years due to
the business failures of large numbers of shipowners and related companies
that have resulted in substantial unemployment among maritime industry
specialists. These specialists then seek arbitration as an alternative source of
employment in the industry.8 Paradoxically, this increase in full-time arbi-
ten about, although not in an exhaustive way. See, e.g., R. W. FLEMING. THE LABOR ARBITRA-
TION PROCESS 74-77 (1965); Mittenthal, Making Arbitration Work: Alternatives in Designing
the Machinery, ARB. J., Sept. 1981, at 35, 37; Elkouri, Informal Observations on Labor Arbi-
tration Today, ARB. J., Sept. 1980, at 41, 44.
84. The belief that serving as an arbitrator is a duty to be borne still exists in most
industries. In Houston, Textile Transactions, in ARBITRATION COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSUR-
ANCE AND TORT CLAIMS (A. Widiss ed. 1979), for example, it is said at 147 that:
In accordance with its historical development, the GAC [General Arbitration Coun-
cil of the Textile Industry] provides a very large panel of textile arbitrators, business
persons active in the industry, who undertake their duties as a contribution to the orderly
marketing of textiles. They therefore act without compensation.
85. See supra table at note 79.
86. The problem of loss of jobs in the marine sector has been particularly intense in the
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trators, working without the added pressure of other employment, has not
increased the speed with which awards are rendered. It is difficult to ex-
plain this, although tentative conclusions may be proferred. First, although
there is an increasing number of full-time arbitrators, as was noted in the
preceeding paragraph, only a handful of the available LMAA and SMA
arbitrators are ever appointed.87 Thus, although a full-time arbitrator may
have more time to hear arbitrations, he must hear more of them. Second,
since arbitrators no longer have the pressure of other employment, they are
free from-any constraints limiting their time to consider the cases which
they have before them. While this may result in more thoughtful awards, it
also increases the amount of time it takes to render an award.
United States, and threatens to grow worse. A 1984 study prepared by Georgetown University
warned that the United States flag merchant marine would shrink to a third of its present size
within just six years unless the Congress took immediate steps to reverse present trends. Mori-
son, Dim Shipping Future Forecast Unless Promotional Moves Made, The Journal of Com-
merce, Dec. 20, 1984, at AI.
Although a number of bills which would aid American shipowners has been introduced
into the 99th Congress, which convened in January, 1985, most of these bills envision only
marginal amounts of aid. In addition, almost all of the bills which have been introduced
originated in previous Congresses, where they were unable to win passage. Morison, Legisla-
tors Face Slew of Ship Bills. The Journal of Commerce, Jan. 4, 1985, at 1.
In contrast to the lack of work in the shipping industry,there is work available as an
arbitrator. Although no statistics appear to be compiled on how many new maritime arbitra-
tions are begun in New York each year, it has been stated that there are between 2,000 and
4,000 new maritime arbitrations begun each year in London (counting only those maritime
arbitrations heard by the LMAA). Hacking, A New Competition - Rivals for Centres of
Arbitration, 1979 LLOYD'S MAR. COM. L.Q. 435, 437. Presumably New York has similar
statistics.
Serving as a maritime arbitrator can prove to be very lucrative. As pointed out in Som-
mer, supra note 15, at 202, a large maritime arbitration can generate arbitrators' fees of up to
$100,000. It is impossible to tell what the average fee charged is, however, because awards
published by the SMA usually exclude the statement of fees. In a recent case, Manchester
Liners, Ltd. v. Compania Espanola de Laminacion, S.M.A. No. 1935 (Arb. at N.Y., Jan 5,
1985), the panel, in an uncontested arbitration, published an award that included fees which
came to $2,500 or $850 per arbitrator. Following the standard practice, the fees were charged
solely against the party which refused to participate in the hearings, but were made payable in
the first instance by the party which did appear in the hearings. Because arbitrators do not
keep (or do not reveal them if they do keep them) time sheets indicating how much time they
spent in hearing and deciding a particular arbitration, it is not possible to say how many hours
the arbitrators worked in order to earn the fees that they set for themselves. It should be
pointed out that the fees charged for an uncontested arbitration are presumably smaller than
those charged for a contested arbitration, as an uncontested arbitration requires less time for
an arbitrator.
87. See supra table and discussion at note 79.
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2. Arbitral Overcommitment
A second cause of delay is the acceptance by both full-time and non
full-time arbitrators of more appointments than they can adequately sched-
ule. 88 Arbitrators overcommit themselves for reasons that are probably not
unique to the arbitration profession. The attractive remuneration that an
arbitration generates, however, is one particular incentive to accepting more
arbitrations than is reasonable, given an arbitrator's then existing work-
load.89 This financial incentive is probably stronger where the arbitrator is
full-time, and thus lacks an alternative source of steady income.
Overcommittment has particularly serious ramifications in light of the
current, more "professionalized" maritime arbitration practice which de-
mands more time at each stage of the proceedings. Arbitrators must find
time to attend more hearings, review greater amounts of evidence, read an
increased number of extensively cited legal briefs,90 and draft and circulate
88. The willingness of arbitrators to accept cases, regardless of whether they have the
time to hear them, was documented in the Iwasaki study, supra note 81. Of those responding,
79% had never had an arbitrator turn down an appointment, 16% had sometimes had an arbi-
trator turn down an appointment, and 5% had very often had an arbitrator turn down an
appointment. It would be reasonable to presume that some appointments are turned down
because a patent conflict exists, as where the party seeking the appointment turns out to be a
subsidiary or affiliate of the company for whom the arbitrator works. See further note 112,
infra. Consider also that an arbitrator can only accept appointments, but not initiate them.
Thus, even if a full-time arbitrator is busy when a new appointment is tendered, he must plan
for the future, when fewer appointments may be offered.
89. See discussion supra note 86. Elkouri, supra note 85, at 44, supports the proposition,
in the context of labor arbitration, that an arbitrator may delay in issuing a decision because
he may take on too many cases. He suggests several additional reasons for this behavior: (1) it
can be extremely difficult for an arbitrator to determine precisely what the upcoming workload
really is, therefore, as with airlines that expect cancellations, an arbitrator may overbook; (2)
the arbitrator has a feeling of obligation not to reject a case after the parties have gone
through the selection process; (3) lower grievance procedure steps taken by parties with whom
the arbitrator has a continuous relation may fail and produce cases which the arbitrator is
bound to accept; (4) there is pride in being asked to serve; (5) arbitrators may fear that they
won't be asked again; (6) the arbitrator has a spirit of adventure and the case presents a
particular challenge; and (7) the arbitrator is attracted by the prospect of increased income.
90. Arbitrators are often beseiged today with three separate sets of legal briefs, assuming
a conventional two party arbitration. The submission of legal briefs begins with a Preliminary
Memorandum by the claimant, which is usually followed by a Preliminary Memorandum of
the respondent. After the hearings are held, the parties normally submit both post-hearing
briefs and post-hearing reply briefs. The Iwasaki study, supra note 81, at 82-85, found that
88% of the lawyers polled thought it useful to cite American admiralty cases, while an equal
number found it useful to cite passages from leading maritime treatises. In addition, 96% of
the lawyers found it worthwhile to cite English cases, and 80% believed it worthwhile to cite
other arbitration awards. Thus, arbitrators are being forced to read what are often voluminous
memoranda filled with legal citations. Reading such briefs is made more difficult because
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longer opinions,'1 than ever before.
3. Formal Opinions
The third cause of arbitrator delay in rendering awards in maritime
arbitrations, in contrast to arbitrations in other fields, 92 is that maritime
arbitrators provide written decisions explaining their decisions.93 Although
courts have consistently held that arbitrators have no obligation to provide
written explanations of their decisions, 94 and although arbitration awards
have no precedential value,9 5 the writing of lengthy opinions and the issuing
many panels are made up of arbitrators who are not lawyers. See Healy, Federal Arbitration,
supra note 37, quote at 232. Therefore, they are not, at least in the early stages of their
careers, familiar with legal writing. In contrast, most other non-admiralty arbitrators refuse to
permit parties to submit post-hearing briefs. In Houston, supra note 87, at 176, it is said that:
Lawyers will appreciate that many textile cases close with oral statements that are
greatly truncated, or even waived. Similarly, textile arbitrators seldom ask for, or need,
or even permit written briefs after closing the oral hearing. A good statement for the
arbitrators at the opening is also the final brief.
91. In a recent New York maritime arbitration, a Partial Final Award ran more than
fifty pages. Because it was only a partial award it only disposed of some of the issues between
the parties. See Yuma Shipping Corp. v. Oswego Operations I Corp., S.M.A. No. 1844 (Arb.
at N.Y., July 1, 1983).
92. Arbitral awards in the construction and commodity brokerage fields, for example,
rarely include written opinions. Of course, some types of maritime arbitrations do follow the
practice of not writing opinions. A notable example are the salvage arbitrations which arise
under the Lloyd's Salvage Agreement. O'May, supra note 63, at 1417 n.24, reports that:
The award itself is usually on a single sheet, signed by the arbitrator. It recites the
salvage agreement, and states the figures found by the arbitrator for the salved values
and the amount of the salvors' award. The award also states the date from which the
interest shall run and the rate thereof.
Contrast this brevity with the opinion of the arbitrators in the Yuma Shipping case, discussed
supra note 91.
With respect to opinion writing, labor arbitrators have tended to follow the practice of the
maritime industry. See generally, Petersen & Rezler, Arbitration Decision Writing: Selected
Criteria, ARB. J., June 1983, at 18; Stark, Arbitration Decision Writing: Why Arbitrators Err,
ARB. J., June 1983, at 30.
93. Providing written opinions causes delay not only because it takes time to write and to
explain a decision, but also because the pressure to write exacerbates the tendency to procrasti-
nate. For a revealing discussion regarding procrastination and formal writing, see Hechinger,
About Education: Colleges Called Major Culprits in Thesis Delay, N.Y. Times, March 8,
1983, at Cl.
94. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
95. In Sun Oil Co. v. Western Sea Transport, Ltd., 1978 A.M.C. 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
the court found that a New York arbitration panel had not committed error when it refused to
follow the holding of a prior New York arbitration panel. Recall, however, that 80% of the
admiralty lawyers polled in the Iwasaki study thought that the citing of previous maritime
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of dissents has become a standard practice.9
One reason for the increase in written, formal opinions is the increas-
ing use of lawyers in arbitrations. Arbitration originally consisted of the
parties presenting their claims and defenses directly to the panel, without
lawyers. Over the years, however, as arbitration became a more formal pro-
cess, the presentment function was taken over by lawyers.97 This, in turn,
led to the writing of both pre- and post-hearing briefs modelled after trial
briefs. 98 This increased formality has caused arbitrators to adopt the prac-
arbitration awards did have a persuasive effect on the panel. See discussion, supra note 90.
Some admiralty lawyers have gone so far as to suggest that maritime arbitration awards will
someday be routinely cited by courts. Bauer, supra note 78, at 146, stated that:
Soon Judges will also cite these awards in their opinions. It has already happened,
but it was an English Judge, not an American Judge, who cited an arbitration award of
the S.M.A. in one of the cases involving the "arrived ship" question. The Maratha En-
voy, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 217, reversed by the House of Lords, [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
301.
Mr. Bauer was indeed prophetic. Two years after he wrote the above, several New York
arbitrations were cited in Apex Oil v. Hector Maritime Inc., No. - (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed, 1981 A.M.C. 2972, 659 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1981) (decision noted without opinion).
96. Many of these decisions gain wide circulation, at least among the members of the
admiralty bar. If the arbitrators are members of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, the
award will be published by the Society and copies distributed to the subscribers to the Soci-
ety's award service. If the award is of general interest it may also be published in American
Maritime Cases, whether or not the arbitrators are members of the Society. See Healy, Fed-
eral Arbitration, supra note 31, at 233.
The availability of SMA awards recently increased dramatically. Beginning in 1984, all of
the awards of the Society since 1965 became available through Lexis, the computer-assisted
research service of the Mead Data Corporation; see Zubrod, supra note 78, at 20. The SMA
data base is provided to all Lexis subscribers at no additional cost. Since many law offices and
law schools have arranged for access to Lexis terminals, the awards of the Society have for the
first time become generally available to lawyers outside the admiralty bar.
97. At one time the rules of some industries specifically prohibited the use of lawyers. For
a case involving such a rule, see Henry Bath & Son Ltd. v. Brigby Prod., [1962] 1 Lloyd's
L.R. 389. Even today, a certain amount of hostility towards the use of lawyers in arbitration
proceedings remains. Thus, Houston wrote, in discussing textile arbitrations: "[Textile arbitra-
tors] desire to hear the unvarnished stories of the disputants without the intervention of a
lawyer with litigation tactics." Houston, supra note 84, at 147.
98. Supra note 90. The reader should not conclude that the briefs submitted in the typi-
cal arbitration are as formal as those submitted in a court proceeding. In particular, since
arbitrators do not follow rules of evidence, there is no need to brief such et'identiary issues as
"hearsay." This does not mean that the arbitrators fail to appreciate the relative worth of a
particular piece of evidence. As pointed out by Healy, "Documentary evidence is freely re-
ceived, although when a document is plainly 'hearsay' evidence, or does not appear to be rele-
vant or material, the arbitrators may remark that they are receiving it for what it is worth."
Healy, Federal Arbitration, supra note 31, at 233. Like courts, arbitrators will also draw
adverse inferences, especially if a party fails to produce a key witness. For an example of such
adverse inference drawing by the arbitrators, see the Yuma Shipping arbitration, S.M.A. No.
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tice of writing opinions. 99
Secondly, the attorneys want formal opinions. Lawyers are used to
dealing with court opinions and stare decisis. Therefore, they have come to
expect that arbitrators will provide an opinion that does more than simply
state which side won and what damages, if any, that party is entitled to
receive.100
A third factor which has encouraged the writing of formal opinions is
that the arbitrators themselves benefit from such opinions in at least two
ways.10 1 First, the writing of a long opinion presumably entitles the panel to
ask for larger fees for their services.1 02 Second, it is through the writing of
an opinion, or a dissent, that arbitrators begin to build up the "track rec-
ord" that is often so crucial in a party's decision on whom to select as its
arbitrator. 03
1844 (Arb. at N.Y., July 1, 1983).
99. Even if an arbitrator does not wish to render an opinion, he may find party pressure
to issue reasons for his award overwhelming. Consider the recent case of Mutual Shipping
Corp. of New York v. Bayshore Shipping Co. of Monrovia, 11985] LLOYD'S MAR. L. NEWS
135 (available May 1, 1985, on LEXIS, Admrty library, UK Cts file). In that case the arbi-
trator issued an award without stating his reasons. He then permitted the parties to see his
"confidential reasons," which explained why he had decided the case as he did. It was ex-
pressly stated, however, that the confidential reasons did not form any part of the award. Upon
seeing the reasons, it became obvious that the arbitrator had made a mistake. The losing party
then sought to have the award vacated by the courts based on the confidential reasons. Al-
though the award was not vacated, the resort to the courts further delayed the paying of the
award by the losing party. See infra text following note 171.
100. Bauer, supra note 78, at 147, has praised the rendering of awards which provide
reasons for the decision, and has argued that maritime arbitrators should follow the practice of
stare decisis: "Previous arbitration decisions by the S.M.A. should be followed unless the rea-
soning is totally unacceptable to a later panel. . . . The rule of stare decisis should be applied
in arbitrations as well as in the courts."
For a less enthusiastic view of precedent in arbitration, see Seitz, III. The Citation of
Authority and Precedent in Arbitration (Its Use and Abuse), ARB. J., Dec. 1983, at 58.
101. Those who favor written awards have argued informally that if an arbitrator is
forced to reduce his views to paper, he will be less likely to "shoot from the hip" and thereby
make what is likely to be a hasty and perhaps erroneous decision.
102. See supra note 86 explaining that arbitrators' fees are not charged on an hourly
basis.
103. The establishment of a track record is vital if an arbitrator is to receive both repeat
appointments and appointments from lawyers who have not previously appointed him. The
Iwasaki study, supra note 81, at 91, found that "Most maritime counsel obtain personal infor-
mation on a potential arbitrator from the awards rendered by him." Thus an arbitrator who
does not write either awards or dissents deprives himself of the best means he has for ensuring
his selection in future cases.
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B. Mechanisms Currently Addressing the Problem of Arbitrator Delay
There are three mechanisms currently addressing the problem of arbi-
trator delay in the rendering of maritime awards. First, there are informal
methods. Second, there are contractual mechanisms. Third, there are judi-
cial methods.
1. Informal Mechanisms
The informal, essentially social, mechanisms which exist to deal with
arbitrator delay can be sub-divided into two categories: a) the pressure
which an arbitrator can bring to bear on his colleagues, and, b) the pressure
which a party can bring to bear on the panel.
a. Arbitrator pressure. Several factors make it desirable for an arbitrator
sitting on a slow-moving panel to prod his fellow arbitrators in moving the
award along. First, arbitrators usually do not receive any compensation un-
til the award is rendered. 1" Second, party-appointed arbitrators, in contrast
to the Chairman who is chosen by the other arbitrators, desire to be se-
lected by the party in future cases.1"5 Thus, if the arbitrator has been ap-
pointed by a party which desires a speedy rendering of the award the arbi-
trator will attempt to do his best to carry out the desire of his appointers.'"
A third reason why an arbitrator will push his fellow arbitrators to render a
speedy award is to burnish his image as an arbitrator who can get "fast
results."10 7
The pressure an arbitrator can bring to bear on other members of his
arbitration panel is limited by a number of practical concerns. If an arbitra-
tor pushes his fellow arbitrators too hard, he risks negative repercussions in
four ways. First, in the short run, they might react by becoming hostile to
the arbitrator and, unconsciously, to the position of the party which ap-
pointed that arbitrator. Thus, the fast-moving arbitrator must be careful
104. Recently, however, arbitrators have begun to ask that security for their fees be
posted. Sommer, supra note 15, at 202. In addition, they have begun to send interim state-
ments of their charges.
105. As noted in the Iwasaki study, supra note 81, at 91, "Maritime counsel's preference
is concentrated on a few well-known arbitrators ... "
106. Although maritime lawyers have routinely stated that they believe that all of the
arbitrators act in an impartial fashion once selected, see, e.g., Iwasaki, supra note 81, at 71,
some admiralty lawyers have expressed doubts. In the Iwasaki study, 17% (4 out of 25) of the
lawyers and law professors responding stated that they thought that party-appointed arbitra-
tors were seldom impartial. Id.
107. Of course, in light of what was said before, there is probably a certain value to a
reputation of being an arbitrator who "knows how to keep things from happening."
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lest the panel render a quick decision which is unfavorable to his ap-
pointer's position.
Second, in the long run, the fast-moving arbitrator risks not being ap-
pointed by his fellow arbitrators as a panel Chairman. Since the party-ap-
pointed arbitrators have complete freedom to select the Chairman,0 8 it is
ill-advised for an arbitrator, especially a full-time arbitrator who has no
other source of income, to make enemies among other arbitrators.
A third factor mitigating against the attempts of the fast-moving arbi-
trator to speed the proceedings exists where he is either an admiralty law-
yer or a person active in the maritime trades. If the fast-moving arbitrator
is an admiralty lawyer and pushes the other members of the panel too
much, he may risk losing any chance he or his firm had of receiving busi-
ness from the other arbitrators. This is particularly true if the other mem-
bers of the panel are active in the maritime trades and are regularly in a
position to influence the choice of which lawyer will receive the company's
legal work.
Fourth, the arbitrator who is also an admiralty lawyer must be careful
since he is likely to come before his fellow arbitrators on future panels in
which he acts as counsel for one side or the other. Likewise, if the fast-
moving arbitrator is himself engaged in the maritime trades, as, for exam-
ple, a manager of a shipowning company, he must be careful not to antago-
nize the other members of the panel. If he does, he runs the risk that if
those arbitrators are on a future panel in an arbitration involving his com-
pany, either as the other side's appointee or as the Chairman, they might
subconsciously be hostile to his company's position.
b. Party pressure. Parties, as well as arbitrators, can exert pressure to in-
crease the speed with which a panel renders an award. The boldest ap-
proach is to require that the arbitration be held in a city other than London
or New York. Tokyo, Houston and San Francisco, among others have be-
gun to actively cultivate the hearing of maritime arbitrations in their cit-
ies.' 0 9 However, a number of factors work against such cities being chosen,
108. Of course, the party-appointed arbitrators must be careful to abide by the terms of
the charter party. Thus, as noted, supra note 36, at least one charter party states that the
chairman must be an admiralty lawyer. In addition, recall the Rahcassi case, discussed supra
note 35, where the appointment of a non-commercial chairman invalidated the arbitration be-
cause the arbitration clause required all of the arbitrators to be commercial men.
109. These cities may seem attractive because they do not have a backlog of arbitrations.
Some cities have begun to publish "how-to" guides promoting themselves and their maritime
arbitration facilities. See, e.g., STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION IN SWE-
DEN (2d ed. 1984).
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at least at the present time.110
A less bold step is for the party wishing a speedy award to select an
arbitrator who either is known to be fast-moving, or who has very few other
arbitral commitments. This method usually fails to work in practice, how-
ever, for at least three reasons. First, parties and their lawyers prefer to
pick an arbitrator with whom they feel comfortable and who has a track
record for results rather than for speed."1 Indeed, there are arbitrators to-
day who are almost always appointed either by Owners or by Charterers,
because their sympathies are thought to lie in one direction or the other.
This perceived need for certainty causes the same arbitrators to be selected
over and over again, even when it is recognized that these arbitrators have
extremely heavy caseloads.
Secondly, when a party does pick an arbitrator who is able to decide a
matter quickly, its attempt to insure a speedy award can be frustrated by
the other side selecting an arbitrator who already has extensive arbitral
commitments. Although parties are free to object to the selection of a par-
ticular arbitrator because of bias or corruption,' 12 no grounds exist for an
110. The three major factors that militate against cities other than New York or London
rising to prominence in arbitration are: 1) the long standing tradition of having maritime dis-
putes resolved in either London or New York, a tradition which is embedded in the pre-printed
arbitration clauses of all commonly used charter parties; 2) the lack of practical experience in
conducting arbitrations; and 3) the lack of an infrastructure which can provide the necessary
panels of arbitrators. For an interesting general article on the matter, see Hacking, supra note
86.
For a discussion of the increasing importance of arbitration in Japan, and the growing
acceptance of Japan as a site for arbitrations involving international commercial transactions,
see generally Akroyd, Arbitration in Japan, in 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
PART Ill DOCUMENTS AND COLLECTED PAPERS 126 (C.Schmitthoff ed. 1980); M. OHASHI,
MARITIME ARBITRATION IN TOKYO - ITS LEGAL ASPECTS (1979). Akroyd points out that
Japan has had an infrastructure for maritime arbitrations for some time, and that infrastruc-
ture is now being used for arbitrations which involve foreign as well as domestic disputes:
The first of such institutions had been the Japan (formerly "Kobe") Shipping Ex-
change arbitration. Under the influence of Common Law oriented maritime custom, it
has increasingly tended to take on disputes of beyond a merely domestic significance.
Accordingly, it has published an international panel of paid arbitrators, disclosing their
names, professional positions and curricula vitae.
Akroyd, supra note 110, at 133.
Ill. The selection of arbitrators who are known to have sympathies in one direction or
another usually precludes the possibility of conducting an arbitration before a sole arbitrator,
which is almost always a speedier and less expensive process. See supra notes 41 and 79.
112. The seminal case on the question of arbitrator bias is Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). In that non-admiralty case, the Court
held an arbitration award defective because the Chairman failed to disclose that he had en-
gaged in repeated and significant business dealings with one of the parties. Admiralty arbitra-
tors have been held to be under the same obligation to disclose possible biases. See Sanko S.S.
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objection due to an arbitrator's lack of time to hear a case.11
Thirdly, a party must be careful lest it becomes too strident in its de-
mand for a speedy decision. Not only does the party risk becoming an irri-
tant to the panel in the present and future arbitrations, but its call for a
speedy decision will often be seen as acquiescence in whatever award is
eventually rendered. A particularly glaring example of this problem is pro-
vided in the recent case of Ove Skou, Copenhagen v. Cia. de Navegacao
Lloyd Brasileiro.11" In that case the evidence had been submitted to the
panel in November, 1982. In November, 1983, counsel for Ove Skou
(OSC) wrote to the panel to inquire when the award would be rendered.
The award was issued a short time later. Counsel for OSC then sought to
have the award vacated because one of the arbitrators had failed to provide
a disclosure statement to the parties or to participate in the deciding and
signing of the award. 1" In ruling against the requested vacation, the court
found that by writing the November, 1983 letter, OSC had waived its right
to complain about defects in the procedure which resulted in the award.,
1 6
Co., Ltd. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 1260 (2d Cir. 1973). But see infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
113. Other objections based on time, however, are recognized. See infra note 148. It
should be further noted that arbitrators never disclose, and parties never ask, whether an arbi-
trator has sufficient time to adjudicate the matter. While it is understandable that the party
wishing to slow down the arbitration would not ask whether the arbitrators had the time to
hear the case, it is also understandable that the party which wants a speedy arbitration will not
ask. Writing in a related context, Sommer stated that:
During the disclosure statements, and on being asked whether the panel is "satisfac-
tory," the practitioner is sometimes placed in the awkward position of having to object or
remain silent. Obviously, if he does not object, the point may be foreclosed. If he does
object, and the arbitrator does not withdraw or there is no evidence available of undue
bias, lack of objectivity, or partiality, the effect of the objection may be to alienate the
arbitrator or panel.
Sommer, supra note 15, at 203-04.
114. No. 84-1097 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1984) (available May 1, 1985, on LEXIS, Admrty
library, Us Cts file).
115. An additional ground, that not all the arbitrators were present at the one hearing
which was held, was originally pressed but later dropped. Id.
116. The court stated:
OSC's final letter to the panel, written a full year later, sought a prompt resolution
of the claim, but made absolutely no mention [of the problems which had been encoun-
tered during the arbitration]. In light of OSC's year-long silence, followed by its letter
suggesting acquiescence in [the problems], this Court must view OSC as having waived
its objection.




In addition to the informal pressures which are available, there are
contractual methods available to parties to speed up an arbitration." 17 In
particular, two methods deserve mention: 1) inclusion by parties of specific
time limits by which the arbitrators must render their decision; and 2) the
provision for issuance of so-called Partial Final Awards.
a. Time limits. Arbitrations are held either on an ad hoc basis or under the
aegis of an arbitral institution.118 In an ad hoc proceeding, parties may pro-
ceed according to rules stipulated in their charter parties. This method,
however, is rarely used. Instead, the parties customarily agree at the first
hearing to have the arbitration proceed with reference to the rules of a
particular arbitral body.1 9 Most maritime arbitrations are held on such a
basis under the LMAA or the SMA, which have developed published sets
of rules which provide a framework by which the arbitration is to
proceed.1
2 0
Most non-maritime arbitral institutions, such as the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA), have a specific rule which requires the arbitrators
to render their award within a set period of time.' 2 ' This time can either be
117. One author, writing on labor arbitration, suggests that such contractual mechanisms
are "too fraught with danger" to be of any benefit and that the best insurance of speed of
decision is "care of the selection of the arbitrator." C. M. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND
LABOR RELATIONS, 277 n.6 (1970).
118. For a comprehensive listing of arbitral institutions around the world which hear
maritime arbitrations, see Berlingieri, supra note 5.
Ad hoc arbitrations conducted under the aegis of organizations such as the LMAA and
SMA can be distinguished from institutional arbitrations conducted by the AAA in the follow-
ing general ways: (1) parties choosing the AAA will so designate in the contract, whereas
parties choosing the SMA or LMAA will wait until the beginning of hearings to designate
applicable rules; (2) the AAA provides an entire organization to implement the arbitration,
whereas the SMA and LMAA provide only the formal structure in the form of rules, which
the parties and arbitrators themselves must implement; (3) under an AAA arbitration the
AAA actively intervenes in the selection of the arbitrators, whereas under an LMAA or SMA
arbitration, the parties choose their arbitrators.
119. See Sommer, supra note 15, at 202.
120. See LONDON MARITIME ARBITRATORS' ASSOCIATION, LONDON MARITIME ARBITRA-
TORS' ASSOCIATION: LIST OF MEMBERS (1984). The SMA adopted its first set of rules on May
12, 1964, and has amended them from time to time. The most current version was revised on
September 15, 1983, following consultation with the Arbitration Committee of the Maritime
Law Association of the United States. The Rules are contained in a booklet entitled RULES
FOR ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. 1983).
121. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES § 41 as
amended and in effect April 1, 1982) (provides that award is to be made no later than 30 days
from the date of the closing of hearings).
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measured from the point when arbitration was instituted, 2 or from when
the dispute is deemed submitted to the arbitrators for final decision .1 2  In
contrast to this widespread practice, however, both the LMAA's12 4 and
SMA's 125 current rules state only that the arbitrators are to render their
122. Berlingieri, supra note 5, at 246.
123. Id.
124. In the LMAA booklet, supra note 120, the LMAA offers "notes on rendering the
award" which provide: "After the Hearing, whether it is on documents only or attended, the
tribunal takes the necessary time to carefully consider its decision and to record it in an
award." Id. at 11. Evidence of the unwillingness of English arbitrators to take responsibility
for post-hearing delay is found in page 12, where it is stated that "[tihe speed of an arbitration
almost entirely depends upon the parties themselves." Finally, in the section entitled "Code of
Conduct," the LMAA notes the requirement that an arbitrator must find time to attend hear-
ings, without mentioning any duty he may have to attend to the rendering of the award at the
close of the hearings. Id. at 13.
125. At one time the SMA did have a time limit in its rules. Old rule 32 provided that
the arbitrators would render their award within ninety days of the close of the hearings. In the
1983 version of the rules however, old rule 32 was replaced by new rule 27, which states that:
"The Arbitrator(s) shall render the Award as expeditiously as reasonably possible." It is still
possible today, however, to find some SMA arbitrations proceeding under the old rules. When
this is the case, however, the normal procedure is for the parties to expressly waive the applica-
tion of rule 32. See, e.g., Transocean Gulf Oil Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., S.M.A. No.
1950 (Arb. at N.Y., Mar. 29, 1984).
In a most recent case, Zapata Products Tankers, Inc. v. Genopet Oil and Petroleum S.A.,
No. 84-7248 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 7, 1985), an arbitration was heard and an award issued pursuant
to the old rules. The award, however, was rendered after the expiration of 90 days. On appeal,
Zapata claimed that old rule 32 was waived, while Genopet claimed that the rule was not
waived. On May 2, 1981 Zapata had sent a letter to counsel for Genopet stating "Enclosed
please find a copy of the Maritime Arbitration Rules which this office agrees to follow in [this
case]." The hearings were closed June 2, 1983. The award was rendered 15 months later, on
September 5, 1984. Neither the proceedings nor the award made any reference to the Rules or
to any procedural requirements. Genopet sought to have the award vacated.
Judge Sweet ruled that the award should be confirmed, stating:
[TIhere is nothing in this record to indicate that the arbitrators were bound by the
Rules or that the Rules were made applicable by the arbitration clause, the agreement of
the parties or if made known to the arbitrators, or by the membership of the arbitrators
in the Association which formulated the Rules, or in the Rules themselves. No authority
is cited to establish the applicability of the Rules as a general proposition. The unac-
knowledged letter from Zapata's counsel cannot be extended beyond its terms, even as-
suming, as I do, that in the absence of contravention it constituted an agreement between
the parties as to the procedure which they would follow during the arbitration. Therefore
there was no requirement that a decision be rendered by the arbitrators within ninety
days of final submission. No protest was made by Genopet on the basis of a violation of
the Rules until after the unfavorable decision had been reached.
Zapata, slip. op. at 4.
The Zapata case was heard by Judge Robert W. Sweet, who faced a similar question in
Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522 F. Supp. 125, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
affid, 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982). The Kamakazi case involved the singer Barry Manilow
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awards in a timely fashion.
The SMA's and LMAA's lack of stipulated time limits may, in part,
be due to the fact that traditionally, courts have construed stipulated time
limits strictly. The courts generally held that if an arbitrator did not render
an award within the time allowed, he thereafter lost the ability to render
the award, because his authority to act as arbitrator had expired."' An
important caveat, however, was that the party which sought to avoid the
award bore the burden of complaining about the expiration of the time
limit. 12 7 If it failed to do so, it was said to have waived its right to claim
that the award rendered was untimely. If an award was deemed by a court
to have been rendered after expiration of the time limit, the award became
a nullity. The party which had sought to uphold the award was then left
with no recourse. Not only could it not claim against the other party, 2 8 but
also, due to the doctrine of arbitral immunity, which parallels judicial im-
munity,129 it could not sue the arbitrator.18 0
Two recent cases, involving arbitrations held pursuant to AAA rules,
suggest, however, that judicial attitudes toward stipulated time limits and
arbitrator immunity may be changing. In the earlier of the two cases, Baar
v. Tigerman,'3' a California lower state court addressed both issues:
whether the award was timely; and whether the arbitrator could be held
and the thirty-day rule of the American Arbitration Association. Judge Sweet ruled that the
award was timely. For more on the rules of the AAA, see infra notes 132 through 137 and
accompanying text.
126. The cases which have developed this law consist in the main of non-admiralty state
decisions. See, e.g., T.W. Poe & Sons v. University of North Carolina, 248 N.C. 617, 104
S.E.2d 189 (1958).
127. C.F. Wooding Co. v. Middletown Elk's Home, 177 Conn. 484, 418 A.2d 904 (1979).
128. Presumably it could start a new arbitration if the applicable time bar had not run.
For other problems which result in having to begin a new arbitration, see infra text following
note 153.
129. Arbitral immunity is based on the recognition of arbitrators as quasi-judicial officers,
who, as such, are exempt from any civil liability for failure to exercise care or skill in the
performance of their arbitral duties; however, liability attaches for improper acts when com-
mitted in a capacity other than that of arbitrator. The underlying principle of arbitrator im-
munity, as with judicial immunity is the preservation of the integrity and independence of the
tribunal. See generally, R. L. BRITrON, THE ARBITRATION GUIDE 61-63 (1982); Friedman,
Correcting Arbitrator Error: The Limited Scope of Judicial Review, ARB. J., Dec. 1978, at 9.
130. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962); Cahn v. Int'l Ladies
Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1962); and Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir.
1977).
131. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979 (1983). The case is also discussed in Note, Arbitration -
Arbitrator Potentially Liable for Failure to Render A Decision, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 147
(1983).
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liable if the award was untimely. In Baar, the AAA"3 2 was asked in 1975 to
arbitrate a number of disputes arising under a limited partnership agree-
ment. Between November, 1976 and March, 1980, an AAA arbitrator held
43 days of evidentiary hearings and ten days of closing arguments. On July
17, 1980 the parties submitted their final briefs, and on July 18, 1980, the
AAA deemed the matter submitted to the arbitrator. Under the rules of the
AAA, an arbitrator has thirty days from the time the arbitration is submit-
ted to him to decide the disputes. Thus, the arbitrator had until August 17,
1980 to render his decision.
The arbitrator did not submit his award by August 17, 1980, and pro-
ceeded to miss further extensions of time granted to him by the parties and
the AAA. The arbitrator finally lost his authority to make the award at all.
Outraged, the parties which had sought the arbitration filed suit against
both the arbitrator and the AAA, claiming breach of contract and negli-
gence. The arbitrator and the AAA demurred on the grounds of arbitral
immunity, and the trial court dismissed the cases. On appeal, the dismissals
were reversed and the suits were reinstated.
Citing the qualitative differences between judicial and arbitral settle-
ment, the Appeals Court decided that the judicial immunity precedent had
only limited applicability to the case. Since arbitration is essentially a pri-
vate contractual arrangement, rather than a public function, the intent of
the parties must be respected and it stressed the need to uphold and enforce
the arbitrator's distinct contractual obligations. Therefore, while the Court
recognized the need to protect the arbitrator while acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity, it noted that an arbitrator ceases to be judge-like in his actions if
he fails to render a timely award. Thus, the Appeals Court ruled that the
plaintiffs had at least made out a cause of action for breach of contract,
since the arbitrator and the AAA had promised to render an award within
thirty days.
In the second of the two cases, Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil
Co.,"3' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed only the issue of
timeliness. The defendant argued that the award rendered by the AAA ar-
bitrators was untimely because the arbitrators filed it after their authority
under the arbitration agreement, which called for an award within 30 days
of the close of hearings, had expired. Briefs had been submitted by both
parties to the arbitrators on September 23, 1983; by October 5, 1983, the
132. For a discussion of the AAA and its emerging international importance, see Straus,
International Arbitration Under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, in 3 IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: PART III DOCUMENTS AND COLLECTED PAPERS 9
(C. Schmitthoff ed. 1980).
133. 751 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1985).
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arbitrators declared the hearings closed."3 4 The arbitrators deliberated, and
the last arbitrator signed the award on November 2, 1983. The AAA re-
ceived the arbitrators' award on November 8, 1983, while the defendant
received its copy of the award on November 10, 1983. On November 8,
1983, however, the defendant had sent a letter to the AAA. The defendant
advised that it would not be bound by the arbitrators' decision, since the
award had not been rendered and received in a timely fashion.
The AAA rejected the defendant's position,8 5 and the matter was
taken to court. The District Court ruled that regardless of whether the
award was untimely, it was still a proper award because the defendant had
been unable to demonstrate that it had suffered any prejudice by the short
delay which had been experienced in receiving the award.' 80 On appeal, the
Second Circuit confirmed the award, but not for the same reason as the
District Court. Instead, the Second Circuit found that by agreeing to be
bound by the AAA's rules, the parties had implicitly agreed to be bound by
all of the AAA's rules. Thus, while rule 41 of the AAA required arbitrators
to file their awards within thirty days, rule 53 stated that the AAA had the
power to interpret its own rules. Since the AAA decided that the award was
timely because it had been signed by all three arbitrators on November 2,
1983, which was less than thirty days from the close of the hearings on
October 5, 1983, the defendant had no basis on which to claim that Rule 41
had not been complied with.8 7 It could therefore be argued that timeliness
is measured and enforced from the date of the arbitrators' signature, not
from the parties' receipt of the award. The Court left open the question
whether an arbitrator would be liable for the failure to render a signed
award within thirty days.
b. Partial final awards. The second contractual mechanism which exists to
speed the rendering of awards is the issuing of Partial Final Awards. Arbi-
trators using this device render an interim award which disposes of some,
but not all, of the issues in a case. The arbitration then continues, until a
Final Award is issued which disposes of the remaining issues.
Both parties and arbitrators have conflicting views on the value and
desirability of Partial Final Awards. On the one hand, they are seen as a
way to insure that the claimant is able to collect its money in a timely
fashion. Defenders of the practice argue that without such a device claim-
134. Id. at 553.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 554-55. Finding the decision of the AAA to be dispositive, the Court did not
reach the issues of waiver or prejudice due to delay.
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ants would lose the use of their money, and run the risk of the respondent
becoming bankrupt prior to the issuance of the Final Award.18 8 On the
other hand, there are those who argue that a Partial Final Award is merely
a band-aid remedy which does not address the real problem of arbitrator
delay. '1 9 In addition, a Partial Final Award can work to the detriment of
the respondent who has counterclaims he wishes to set off against the dam-
ages sought by the claimant. If the Partial Final Award does not factor in
these set-offs until the Final Award stage, the respondent may suffer all of
the problems which the claimant would have suffered if a Partial Final
Award had not been issued.
Partial Final Awards have received an equally mixed response from
the courts. Although courts are hesitant to second guess the procedures fol-
lowed by arbitrators,140 they have reviewed a number of Partial Final
Awards. At times the courts have held that a Partial Final Award could be
confirmed before the Final Award stage;' 4 at other times they have held
that a Partial Final Award could not be confirmed. 42
Recently, however, the tide seems to have turned against Partial Final
Awards. While it was once thought nearly impossible to vacate an arbitra-
tion award without a showing of extreme bias, corruption or fraud, 4" two
recent Partial Final Awards were vacated despite the fact that no bias or
corruption was present. 44 In the first case, Sea Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van
Weelde Scheepvaartkahtoor, a district court vacated a Partial Final
Award, stating that the courts will not enforce an arbitration award that is
incomplete, ambiguous or contradictory. The court suggested that the
proper disposition of such a case was to remand the award for clarification,
unless the court deemed such an order fruitless under the facts of the case;
138. O'May, supra note 63, at 1422 and infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
139. Address by R. Glenn Bauer, Esq., Society of Maritime Arbitrators' Monthly
Luncheon (Sept. 12, 1984) (available in office of Maryland Journal of International Law and
Trade). It was said there that "The time and energy spent by arbitrators in rendering an
interim award or partial final award might be better spent in trying to speed up their comple-
tion of the arbitration so that a final, binding and enforceable award can be rendered."
140. Kimball, supra note 3, at 80-82.
141. The leading decision holding that a Partial Final Award is subject to judicial confir-
mation is Eurolines Shipping Co., S.A. v. Metal Transport Corp., 491 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
142. See, e.g., Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1980).
143. Kimball, supra note 33.
144. Sea Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor, 574 F. Supp. 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) and Liberian Vertex Transports, Inc. v. Associated Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 1984




which it did in the case at bar.14
In the second case, in dismissing the appeal of an order refusing to
confirm a Partial Final Award in Liberian Vertex Transports, Inc. v. Asso-
ciated Bulk Carriers, Ltd.,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited
with approval the dissenting opinion of one of the arbitrators, who had writ-
ten that:1 4
7
To segregate this issue into what appears to be disputed and undis-
puted portions, always an imprecise art in the early stages of an arbi-
tration, is, I submit, inconsistent with prior arbitration practice and can
only result in needlessly fragmenting these proceedings. There can be
no finality in the disposition of this issue until all claims pertaining to it
are adjudicated.
3. Judicial Mechanisms
The final mechanism which exists to combat arbitrator delay is to re-
sort to judicial aid. In the United States a party suffering from delay in an
arbitration can seek court aid, but such aid will only be given if the delay is
caused by the other party.148 At no time will the courts intervene if the
cause of the delay is an arbitrator, except, of course, if a specific time limit
has been incorporated into the arbitration clause. 149
This situation is treated differently in England.150 Under section 13(3)
of the Arbitration Act of 1950 as amended, 15' a dilatory arbitrator can be
145. Sea Dragon, Inc., 574 F.Supp. 367.
146. 738 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984).
147. Id. at 86.
148. Thus, for example, section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1982), provides relief to a party aggrieved by the failure of the other side to appoint its
arbitrator in a timely fashion. The remedy is to move the court for an order appointing an
arbitrator for the party causing the delay. Likewise, section 12 of the Act requires that a party
wishing to vacate an award begin such an action within three months of the rendering of the
award. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
149. Supra text following note 125 through note 133.
150. The following discussion is drawn from M. MUSTILL AND S. BOYD, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 196-97 (1982).
151. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, amended by ch. 3, 1975 and ch. 42, 1979;
see generally, Steyn, Arbitration and the Courts: Arbitration Systems in England and Wales,
ARB. J., Dec. 1980, at 9.
Two 1980 cases illustrate the English courts' construction of section 13 (3). In Succula
Ltd. v. Harland & Wolf Ltd. [19801 2 Lloyd's L. R. 381, the court said it would not intervene
when there was no delay and the arbitrators had done nothing because the parties had not
asked them to do anything. Id. at 388. In Pratt v. Swanmore Builders Ltd. [1980] 2 Lloyd's L.
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removed by a court. If an arbitrator is removed, he loses his right to be
compensated for his services, and a replacement is made. 52 As has been
pointed out, however, this remedy is less than satisfactory:"'
[These statutory sanctions] may suffice when the delay occurs at
the outset, since an arbitrator appointed by way of replacement may be
able to make up the lost time. But delay at a later stage may result in
serious financial loss. If evidence has been taken or argument adduced,
the parties will have to pay for the process to be repeated. An impor-
tant witness may die or his recollection may be dimmed during the
period of delay, so that the party who had intended to call him may
find his case seriously weakened. The delay . . . will postpone the mo-
ment at which the award is made, and at which the claimant can col-
lect the sums to which he is entitled; the recovery of interest may not
be an adequate remedy.
Despite these problems, the English courts will not enforce the duty to pro-
ceed diligently by ordering specific performance. Instead, the arbitrator is
simply removed. 1 4 Thus, English arbitration disputants are only slightly
better off than their American counterparts.
IV. THE IMPACT OF DELAY
What impact delay has on parties considering arbitration is a difficult
question to answer, 155 since no empirical data has been collected on the
matter. It seems likely, however, that delay has at least two effects.
First, parties lose confidence in the system and are probably more re-
luctant to enter into arbitration as a result of delay. Instead of entering into
arbitration, it is likely that many parties are agreeing to accept settlements
R. 504, the court removed the arbitrator pursuant to the misconduct provision of section 23
(I). The court did not remove the arbitrator under section 13 (3), stating that the delay in the
arbitration resulted from misconduct and not from failure to use reasonable dispatch. Id. at
512.
152. M. MUSTILL AND S. BOYD, supra note 150, at 196.
153. Id. at 197.
154. Id.
155. The specific impact of delay will necessarily depend on the particular industry in-
volved. Mittenthal, supra note 83, at 37, provides a glimpse of the impact delay in rendering
labor arbitration awards has:
When [delay occurs] a variety of pressures are created. Most of them land on the
union representative who is beleaguered by grievants who are understandably anxious to
hear the answer to their complaint. Delay is corrosive, undermining the confidence of the
parties in both the arbitrator and the arbitration process.
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of their claims, in order to receive at least a part of what is owed them.1 56
This willingness to settle must be presumed to be occurring more frequently
in the maritime industry than in other industries because of the generally
depressed state of world shipping1 57 and the severe cash flow problems
which have become common among shipping companies.' 8 Although some
savings of cost are realized through the settlement of a claim, 5 9 on the
whole, the amount received for bona fide claims is less than what the claim
would bring in arbitration.'" 0
A second impact of delay is that some arbitration awards become val-
ueless by the time they are issued because the losing party has either filed
for bankruptcy or become judgment proof.'" Because of the anemic condi-
156. Some commentators have argued, however, that "[Although] [a]rbitration statutes
generally do not set time limits [for the rendering of awards,] it is unlikely that a statutory
fettering of the parties' freedom would facilitate the use of arbitration." G. WiLNER, supra
note 2, at § 29:01. It should be pointed out, however, that the foregoing was written in the
context of arbitrations in general, and not with reference to the special problems of the ship-
ping industry. Those problems are explained in detail infra notes 157, 158 and 162. Of course,
since an agreement to settle terminates the arbitration prematurely, thus leaving no record, it
is impossible to quantify the extent to which settlement is occurring in the maritime field.
157. Problems in the shipping industry have become particularly acute in the last few
years. In December, 1983, the international community was shocked when Hellenic Lines, a
Greek company with numerous ships, was forced into bankruptcy. For a thoroegh account of
the collapse of Hellenic Lines, see Hayman and Glass, The Hellenic Inheritance, SEATRADE,
Dec. 1983, at 3. The shipping world suffered an even greater shock in December, 1984, when
the Swedish shipping company Saleninvest announced that it too was bankrupt. The filing for
bankruptcy by Saleninvest is the largest bankruptcy in Sweden since the dark days of the
1930s. For accounts of that bankruptcy, see Sweden's Saleninvest Announces Bankruptcy,
Journal of Commerce, Dec. 20, 1984, at IA, and Saleninvest Ramifications Start to Unfold,
Lloyd's List, Dec. 22, 1984, at 1.
158. Because of the weakness of the shipping industry, banks have become very hesitant
about lending to shipping companies. This, in turn, has led to a serious cash squeeze among
shipowners. The problem is examined in Oakes, Nailed to the Mast, SEATRADE, Apr. 1983, at
3, and Porter, Heavily Indebted Shipping Sector Faces Slowdown in Bank Lending, Journal of
Commerce, Jan. 7, 1985, at IA. As a result, shipowners are often faced with the need to
accept even paltry settlements, simply to help meet their payrolls.
159. The most significant cost which is saved, of course, is attorneys' fees. Other costs
which are either reduced or avoided include arbitrators' fees, expert witness fees, and the loss
of time of personnel, who would be required to help the attorneys prepare the case instead of
working on their normal tasks.
160. It is a standard practice among the admiralty bar, for example, not to include inter-
est when calculating how much of a settlement to offer. Interest, however, can be very signifi-
cant, since arbitrators have been known to calculate interest at a rate as high as 20%. See, e.g.,
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Chih Hua Wang, S.M.A. No. 1579 (Arb. at N.Y., Jul. 31, 1981).
161. The collapse of the Hellenic Lines shipping company, described supra note 157,
came at a time when many arbitrations were being prosecuted against the company. A com-
plete listing of these claims can be found among the records of the Hellenic Lines Bankruptcy
1985]
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tion of marine companies, and the unique corporate structures which per-
vade the industry,1 62 maritime arbitration awards in particular need to be
rendered in a timely fashion.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ARBITRATOR POST-HEARING DELAY
Several factors cause post-hearing delay in maritime proceedings. Cur-
rently, only limited internal and contractual mechanisms exist to redress the
causes of delay. The following rules are therefore recommended for adop-
tion in arbitration agreements, arbitral body rules and legislative
enactments.
A. Proposed Rules
1. Arbitrator Schedule Disclosure
A prospective maritime arbitrator is required to disclose within fifteen
days of their appointment by either party or as panel Chairman, the
amount of time he expects to be able to devote to the arbitration. This
disclosure is in addition to the disclosure of possible bias which is al-
ready required.'63 If an arbitrator's schedule indicates that he will be
suit. The suit is currently being heard under the respective captions In re Transpacific Carriers
Corp., No. 83-B 11775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) and Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., No. 83-8560 (S.D.N.Y.). The dual proceedings have caused numerous jurisdictional dis-
putes between the two courts. See, e.g., Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
585 F. Supp. 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
162. The shipping industry often utilizes what is known as the "one ship company." Al-
though a shipowner owns ten ships, he will not normally set up a single company. Rather, he
will incorporate ten separate companies, each with just one ship and no other assets. In this
way, if one ship is arrested in order to satisfy the shipowner's debts, the other nine ships are
beyond the reach of the creditors. Although it is possible to pierce the corporate veil to get at
the other ships, such piercing is very difficult to achieve. Thus, if a ship has been arrested by
many creditors, an individual creditor may find that there is nothing left for it to attach. In
such a situation, the creditor may give up its claim, rather than undertake the expensive, and
often futile, attempt to chase after one of the other ships. For a discussion of the problem, see
Tettenborn, The Time Charterer, the One-Ship Company and the Sister-Ship Action in rem,
1981 LLOYD'S MAR. CoM. L.Q. 507 and cases cited therein; see also Walkovszky v. Carlton,
18 N.Y. 2d 414, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966) (the New York Court of Appeals
refused to pierce the corporate veil where the holding company consisted of several companies
with assets of one taxicab each). For two recent cases which did pierce the veil, albeit in
somewhat unique circumstances, see In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 1984 A.M.C. 2123
(N.D. III. 1984); and Astarte Shipping Co. v. Chi Yuen Navigation Co., Ltd., No. 84-5350
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1985).
163. As was pointed out, supra note 112, the current disclosure requirements demand
disclosure only of those relationships which might affect the arbitrator's ability to fairly decide
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unable to decide a matter in a timely fashion, the opposing party may
demand that the appointing party select a new arbitrator. A party is
entitled to three such challenges, and further challenges are permitted
if leave from the appropriate court is obtained.'" A party shown to
have selected arbitrators for the purpose of delaying the arbitration will
be subject to costs.
2. Time Limits
a. Arbitrators are required to render their awards within forty-five
days of the close of hearings, subject to agreement of the parties to
provide for a longer or shorter period of time, except that where the
parties ask for a written opinion under rule 3, an arbitrator has
ninety days to render an award. Arbitrators are prohibited from re-
questing extensions.
b. The doctrine of arbitral immunity is hereby limited so that an
arbitrator who fails to meet the applicable time limit will be liable
for all damages suffered by either party.
c. Once the applicable time limit has expired;
i. either party may deem the arbitration a nullity and the other
party may begin a new arbitration within three months; or
ii. both parties may proceed with the current arbitration, subject
to agreement on an extension of the time limit in which the arbi-
trator must render the award.
the matter. The courts, however, have enforced this duty only sparingly. Thus, in Andros Com-
pania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978), the Court
refused to vacate a maritime arbitration award because of the failure of two of the arbitrators
to provide full disclosures. The Court reasoned that "The very intimacy of the group from
which specialized arbitrators are chosen suggests that the parties can justifiably be held to
know at least some kinds of basic information about an arbitrator's personal and business
contacts." Andros, 579 F.2d at 701.
164. All maritime arbitrations are conducted under the authority of a contractually or
statutorily designated court. See, e.g.. sections 4, 10, and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), and section 1045 of Book X of the WEST GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (ZPO 1978), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW
YORK CONVENTION: PART IV NATIONAL LEGISLATION § 3.1 (G. Gaja ed. 1978). Parties are
free to state in the arbitration agreement which Court shall have jurisdiction with regard to
the arbitral proceedings. Jurisdiction is invoked for purposes such as enforcing the award or
having an arbitrator named on behalf of a party which refuses to participate in the arbitration.
If the agreement does not name a Court, as is usually the case, then the statutory provisions
will govern.
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3. Written Opinions
Maritime arbitrators will not provide written opinions, unless both par-
ties agree otherwise. If the parties do ask for opinions, arbitrators will
have ninety days to render their decision.
4. Expedited Arbitration
Parties have the right to demand expedited arbitration. Arbitrators are
required to render their opinion within one week of the close of hear-
ings, but parties do not have the right to demand formal written opin-
ions. The arbitrators are required to state whether, in their opinion,
there has been an actual need for expedited arbitration. If the arbitra-
tors find that the party requesting the expedited award has not proven
the need for such an award, that party will be liable for three times the
cost suffered by the other side, even if the party which asked for the
expedited award prevailed on the merits of the issues before the panel.
B. Discussion of Proposed Rules
These four amendments would reduce maritime arbitrator delay in the
following ways. The first provision would broaden the scope of arbitrator
disclosure by forcing arbitrators to expose their other commitments. In this
way a party would be able to judge whether or not an arbitrator had the
time necessary to hear a matter fairly. If an arbitrator were not able to
hear a matter in a timely fashion, the opposing party could require the
appointment of a different arbitrator. Of course, such a procedure could be
abused by a party always finding the nominee to be "too busy." Thus, after
the rejection of a third nominee, court leave would be required before any
further appointees could be refused. An objecting party would therefore
have to use its challenges carefully, since if it were forced to go to court to
receive judicial permission for further challenges it would be adding to the
very delay it was seeking to avoid.
The second rule would require arbitrators to render their awards
within forty-five days, in the absence of party agreement to a shorter or
longer period of time. An agreement to abide by the rules of the AAA, for
example, would take precedence and would therefore require the arbitrators
to render their awards pursuant to the rules of that body. Assuming that
the parties had made no separate agreement on the question of time limits,
the arbitrators would not be allowed to ask for, or grant themselves, exten-
sions of time. This is a vital provision, for few parties would risk the wrath
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of a panel by denying its request for more time. In addition, because courts
will usually not review the procedural aspects of arbitration, it is important
that arbitrators not have the right sua sponte to grant extensions of time
for the rendering of awards.
If an arbitrator were to fail to meet the forty-five day time limit, he
would then become liable for damages unless the parties were to grant him
an extension. " In order to be reasonable, however, the arbitrator would not
become liable for all damages suffered by a party, but only for those which
flowed directly from the failure to issue the award in a timely fashion.
Were an arbitrator to miss the time limit and not receive an extension, he
would not thereafter issue an award, since justice would hardly be served by
having a reluctant arbitrator render an award.16 6 If a party were unable to
collect against the losing side because the losing side had become judgment-
proof during the period between when the award should have been issued
and when it was issued, the winning party would then have a cause of ac-
tion against the arbitrator.1 6 7
165. Note that both parties would have to grant the extension. If only one party was
needed for an extension, the party which stood the greatest likelihood of losing would always
grant the extension in order to delay the issuing of the award.
166. See M. MUSTILL AND S. BOYD supra note 150, at 197.
167. Two problems with this new right of action may require special solutions. First, what
should be done when two arbitrators have faithfully performed their services, but the award is
not issued due to problems with the third arbitrator? This, of course, was the situation in Ove
Skou, No. 84-1097 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1984) discussed supra note 114. Blame could either be
placed solely on the non-diligent arbitrator, or against the entire panel, or solely against the
panel chairman, or against the panel chairman and the non-diligent arbitrator. None of these
methods is clearly superior.
A second consideration which may require special attention is the possibility that the
arbitrators may turn out to be judgment proof, at least where the award to be collected is very
large. Hopefully, however, arbitrators would avoid the problem by buying arbitrator malprac-
tice insurance. If purchased through groups such as the SMA or LMAA, such insurance
would probably not be very expensive. Alternatively, each award could assess a nominal fee on
both parties which would be used to buy arbitrator malpractice insurance for all arbitrators.
Because arbitrators are currently clothed with immunity, arbitrator malpractice insurance does
not exist.
Other professionals - such as lawyers, doctors, and clergy - have, however, come to rely
on malpractice insurance. See, e.g., Note, Lawyer Malpractice - The Duty to Perform Legal
Research, 32 FED. INS. COUN. Q. 199 (1982); Berlin, Malpractice and Radiologists, 28 MEDI-
CAL TRIAL TECH. Q. 74 (1981); Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New
Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1981). Just recently, malpractice insurance became available
to college and university professors, a group which had not previously carried such insurance.
Offered through the American Association of University Professors, a yearly premium of $50
purchases $I,000,000 worth of protection. See Quade, Prof Protection: Liability Insurance
Available, 71 A.B.A. J. 35 (May 1985). Thus, there is no reason why maritime arbitrators
should not carry insurance. Such a requirement is especially equitable in light of the fact that,
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The third rule would prohibit arbitrators from rendering written opin-
ions to explain their decisions unless both sides agreed to have an opinion
rendered. If the parties were to agree to have opinions rendered, the arbi-
trators would be given ninety days, instead of forty-five days, to issue an
award, in order to provide sufficient time for the writing of the opinion. The
prohibition on writing awards would reduce delay in two ways. First, arbi-
trators would be able to render more rapidly their awards because they
would simply have to state who won and how much the losing side would
have to pay. 68 Thus, there would be no need for drafting and circulating
opinions among the panel members. Second, it is almost impossible to chal-
lenge an arbitration award which does not provide reasons.169 Once an
award gives an explanation for its decision, however, parties would be able
to challenge the award on a number of grounds 70 which are not available if
the award contains no explanation.' 71 Since an arbitration award is not paid
unlike some other types of arbitrators, maritime arbitrators are compensated for their services.
Supra note 86.
168. As was explained in O'May, supra note 63, this is the procedure which is used in
salvage arbitrations conducted pursuant to the Lloyd's Salvage Agreement. O'May notes that
"The award will be published by the Committee of Lloyd's to all of the parties simultaneously,
usually within two to three weeks of the hearing." O'May, supra note 63, at 1417.
The rendering of oral decisions has been suggested as a solution to post-hearing delay in
labor arbitrations. See R. W. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 74-77; but see Mittenthal, supra note
83, at 37 (arguing that providing so-called "bench decisions" is an overrated solution and that
written decisions serve a useful purpose).
169. Kimball, supra note 33, at 74-88.
170. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, for example, allows a party to challenge
an arbitration award where:
I. it was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
2. there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators;
3. procedural misconduct by the arbitrators resulted in prejudice to either of the
parties;
4. the arbitrators exceeded their powers or failed to execute a sufficiently definite
award.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
Parties have sometimes argued that a delay in rendering an award is sufficient proof of
prejudice under the third paragraph of Section 10 (the procedural misconduct ground). The
argument has always been raised, however, with regards to a vacation of the award, and not as
a means of establishing arbitrator liability. See, e.g., Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music
Corp., 522 F. Supp. 125, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982); discussed
supra note 125.
171. This point was elegantly made in I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc.,
500 F.2d 424, 429 (2d Cir. 1974), where it was said that:
It seems rather anomalous, but had the arbitral majority failed to render a written
opinion in this case, our ability. . . to review that decision would be greatly limited.
Indeed, the AAA apparently discourages the practice of written arbitral opinions in order
to insulate the arbitral process from any judicial review.
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until all appeals have been exhausted, bringing an appeal is another way in
which the winning side is kept from collecting on its award in a timely
fashion.
The final rule would provide a means for expedited arbitration.1 7 2 In
order to ensure that this procedure only be used when a legitimate need
exists, a party which calls for expedited arbitration would be subject to
treble costs if the panel were to find that there had been no need for the
expedited procedure.
C. Implementation
Since arbitration is fundamentally an extrajudicial means of dispute
resolution, limited only by agreement of the parties, the parties may agree
in their charter party to proceed pursuant to the foregoing rules. It is un-
likely, however, that parties will voluntarily insert such terms into their con-
tracts. Their failure to do so will not be caused by a lack of recognition of
the problem of arbitrator delay. Rather, parties simply do not expect, at the
time the contract is concluded, to experience problems in the performance
of the contract.'77 The negotiation that will take place will concern the
terms of price and performance, not detailed aspects of dispute resolution
procedure.
Thus, legislative action by national governments or arbitral bodies is
clearly necessary to solve the problem. Until such action is taken, however,
it is recommended that parties insist upon terms which deal specifically
with the problem of post-hearing arbitrator delay." 4
172. Cf. the American Arbitration Association provisions for expedited arbitration.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES §§ 54-58 (As
amended and in effect April 1, 1982). Although both the LMAA and SMA have expedited
arbitration procedures, those procedures can only be invoked if both parties agree. Therefore,
where expedited arbitration is most needed-where one party is likely to become judgment
proof-the existing procedures will not be used because the necessary consent will not be
forthcoming. See supra notes 155-62.
173. If problems were expected at the time a contract was being negotiated, it seems
unlikely that it would be entered into. Exceptions to this truism occur where the party which
suspects that there will be trouble has no other choice but to enter the contract, either because
no one else can deliver the services or goods which the other side can produce, or because the
pressure of time makes recourse to a different party impossible.
174. As one commentator has said: "Just because parties have followed a certain proce-
dure for 20 years does not mean they should continue to do so. When new problems suggest
the need for new policies, a change should be made. Speed, economy, and justice can be built
into any grievance machinery." Mittenthal, supra note 83, at 36.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Persons and companies involved in the maritime industry are familiar
with the problem of post-hearing arbitrator delay.175 Unfortunately, they
have attempted to remedy the problem only through piecemeal solutions .
1 7
While these solutions may work in a given situation, they do not provide
any relief from the general problem of arbitrator delay. What is needed is
an industry-wide reform of the arbitration system through legislation and
arbitral society rule reform. Anything less will leave the problem as it is
now: a potentially serious stumbling block to the orderly and timely resolu-
tion of maritime disputes.
175. Letter to the Editor from John G. Poles, Quo Vadis Maritime Arbitration?,
N.Y.L.J. Mar. 2, 1983, at 2.
176. An example of a piecemeal solution can be found in Marlucidez Armadora, S.A. v.
Burmah Oil Tankers Ltd., S.M.A. No. 2024 (Arb. at N.Y., Sept. 26, 1984). In that case the
arbitrators rendered an oral decision at the hearing, and announced that a formal opinion
would be written when time permitted.
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